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On 4 March 1998, Vice Admiral D. T. Oliver, Chief of Naval Personnel and 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Personnel), stated before the 
Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Recruiting and 
Retention: 
Without question, aviation retention must improve significantly prior to 
the end of the century to meet future squadron department head 
requirements…  Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) and Aviation 
Continuation Pay (ACP) continue to serve as baseline retention tools for 
ensuring the availability of adequate numbers of career force aviators to 
meet mission requirements.  Enhancements to ACIP and ACP, included in 
the FY98 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], restored some 
value to these pays which had been lost through inflation, and narrowed 
the disparity between military and civilian aviation salaries.  Accessions 
below requirements in the downsizing environment of Fiscal Years 1992-
95 will result in a need to increase aviation retention well above historic 
norms. 
 
 Information from the Naval Aviation Career Manager’s office (2002) shows that 
in fiscal year 2002, there were 12,977 total naval aviators, both pilots and Naval Flight 
Officers.    In the junior officer ranks (Lieutenant, Lieutenant Junior Grade, and Ensign), 
there were 8,275 total aviators.  This is 1,052 aviators below Navy requirements.  
Information from the Naval Aviation Career Manager’s office dealing with the pilot 








Graph 1.  Qualified Pilot Inventory as of October 2001 showing the current 
Pilot inventory versus the number of authorized pilot billets. 
 
Navy Pilot Inventory vs. 
Officer Program Authorization 
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      Source:  Aviation Officers Issues Brief from the Naval Aviation Community 
                    Manager’s Office. 
 
Graph 1 shows that at the end of fiscal year 2001, there were 6,905 total naval 
pilots.  This includes 4,450 Lieutenant and Lieutenant Commander Navy pilots, 558 
pilots less than the requirement for those ranks.  As Vice Admiral Oliver stated, 
“retention must improve significantly to meet future squadron department head 
requirements.”  The deficit seen is due to the low aviator retention after the initial 
commitment aviators incur from flight training.  Currently, all naval aviators accrue a 
commitment, Minimum Service Requirement (MSR), of seven years of service after 
receiving their gold wings for the helicopter and propeller pipelines and eight years after 
they receive their wings in the jet pipeline.  With average aviators requiring two to three 
years to receive their wings, the aviators’ first opportunity to leave the service occurs at 
the nine to eleven years of service (YOS) mark.   
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Graph 2 below shows the Navy Pilot Inventory as of October 2001. 
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Source:  Aviation Officers Issues Brief from the Naval Aviation Community 
              Manager’s Office. 
 
Note:   “Notch” represents the so called T-notch year groups of 1993-1995. 
              These year groups entered flight training at lower than normal accession 
              numbers to alleviate the backlog in the training command.  
 As seen in Graph 2 above, pilots leaving at the end of their initial commitment 
make up the largest attrition of Navy pilots.  Starting at the nine to eleven year mark, 
pilots will end their initial commitment incurred from their pilot training and become 
eligible to voluntarily leave the service.  A great many leave during this time period.  
This leaves a large shortfall in senior aviator positions at the Lieutenant Commander 
(LCDR) department head level that occurs at 12 to 14 YOS.  To fill current department 
head requirements, 286 pilots per year group are needed.  This is 42 percent of the 680 
pilots per year group for Lieutenants (Naval Aviation Career Manager, 2002).  The Naval 
Aviation Career Manager’s office (2002) shows a 38 percent historical retention average 
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for Navy pilots, while predicting the need for 85 percent retention in fiscal year 2005 to 
accommodate the 1994 year group.  Because each of the Lieutenant (LT) year groups are 
already below the required manning of 680 pilots, a retention rate greater than predicted 
is needed to fill required department headed manning.  
While retention problems exist in all officer communities throughout the Navy, 
the aviation community has been hit hardest because of a demand for military pilots in 
the civilian aviation sector.  The demand for pilots in the civilian sector as well as the lure 
of the large airline salary for highly trained military pilots makes retention of military 
aviators particularly difficult.  For example, according to the 2002-2003 Salary Survey 
conducted by AIR, Inc., the income of an American Airlines pilot who makes captain by 
his or her tenth year is currently $12,606 a month or $151,272 a year.   Even in just five 
years at American Airlines, a first officer will make $8,090 a month or $97,080 a year 
(Airline Facts Source:  2002-2003 Salary Survey by AIR Inc., 2002).  This is comparable 
to military pay with the retention bonus for a Lieutenant Commander pilot with 14 years 
of service.   Following the events of September 11, 2001, the airline industry has slowed 
down but will surely regain strength.  Airline hiring is currently low but historically 
hiring is cyclic and will go up again.  Even now AIR Inc. showed that by December 18, 
2002, 5,657 pilots were hired in 2002 including 534 by the major airlines and 1,601 by 
national airlines (regional) (Airline Pilot Hiring – November ’02 Summary, AIR Inc., 
2002).   
A junior officer must always choose between remaining in the Navy or leaving 
for a civilian career.  A lot of that decision is based on non-financial factors such as time 
away from home, movements of spouse/family, etc.  To entice aviators to remain, the 
Navy has traditionally used a retention bonus.  From 1989 to 2000, the Navy used a 
bonus program called Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP).  ACP was targeted only at 
platform communities that evidenced pilot shortfalls.  ACP ranged from $0 to $25,000 
depending on year and platform.  ACP did not bring pilot retention up to the needed level 
(Moore and Griffis, 1999).  By February of 1999, the shortage was 1,153 aviators or 
approximately 15 percent of requirements (Mills, 1999). 
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On July 7, 2000, the new bonus program, Aviation Career Continuation Pay 
(ACCP), increased the bonus under ACP to $25,000 a year for a five-year contract of 
$125,000.  This program was started to improve retention in sea duty billets and to 
provide equality to all aviators regardless of platform (Moore and Griffis, 1999).  These 
bonuses were given typically as a $62,500 lump-sum payment up front and $12,500 for 
the next five years.  The aviator also has the option of a year-by-year contract instead, 
which yields a $15,000 bonus annually for those same five years.  ACCP, unlike ACP, 
was offered to all aviators independent of specific retention levels in a particular 
platform-based community. 
The problem here, as Vice Admiral Oliver says, is “Aviation Career Incentive Pay 
(ACIP) and Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) continue to serve as baseline retention 
tools” and these are used to try to even “the disparity between military and civilian 
aviation salaries.”  Perhaps larger bonuses will help with the problem, but as Adam 
Hebert of Air Force Magazine states: “Higher pay and bonuses alone will not fix the 
problem, as analysis has shown pilots essentially lose lifetime income with every year 
they remain on active duty instead of leaving for the airlines—even when enhanced 
bonuses and retirement are taken into account.”  Perhaps instead of continuously raising 
bonus levels and therefore the military budget to improve aviator retention, the Navy can 
find other options that might improve retention for less money.   
 
B. OBJECTIVES/PURPOSE  
The first step in proposing alternatives to bonuses is to gather information 
regarding job satisfaction.  The purpose of this research is to examine and supplement the 
information, much of it related to job satisfaction, that the Navy uses to design policies 
for retaining fixed wing aviators through their department head tours.  Beginning in 
February 2001, the Navy instituted the Argus Career Milestone and Tracking System 
web-based survey.  Argus is an important tool used by the Navy to study retention and 
job satisfaction issues. The goal of this paper is first to examine whether factors for 
retention differ within the aviation community as a whole by looking at retention within 
the aviation community and at factors addressed in the Argus data base.  However, this 
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database does not currently disaggregate fixed wing aviators based on the platforms 
flown.  Some factors that affect retention may be unique to the individual sub-
communities.  So the second part of this research involved gathering more detailed 
information about job satisfaction by interviewing a sample of fleet aviators.  The second 
objective is to determine from the interviews whether there are retention factors that are 
not taken into account by the ARGUS database or are platform specific.  The more 
detailed information generated in this study can help the Navy design more effective 
polices for retaining junior officer fixed wing naval aviators.  
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 1.  Do retention disparities exist between aviators of different platforms within the 
fixed wing aviation community (i.e., F/A-18, E-A6B, P-3C, etc.)? 
2.  Do career decisions made to stay in or leave naval aviation differ 
systematically by platform sub-communities or does the ARGUS database accurately 
reflect the reasons for all aviators? 
 3.  What other factors, not available in the ARGUS personnel database, exist that 
affect the junior aviator’s decision to remain in the Navy?  Are any of these factors 
platform specific? 
 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, ASSUMPTIONS 
This study is limited by the need to interview current active duty naval aviators in 
fleet squadrons.  These aviators are located throughout the United States as well as 
deployed around the world.  Due to a lack of sponsored travel funds, only select Naval 
Air Stations were used for data gathering.  A total of three naval air stations were chosen.  
To keep fleet coastal bias to a minimum, two bases in the Atlantic Fleet (NAS Oceana 
and NAS Norfolk) and one in the Pacific Fleet (NAS Whidbey Island) were chosen.   
A great number of naval aviators and NFOs exist in the naval aviation 
community, all of whom fly various types of aircraft.  To limit the scope of this study and 
operate within the constraints of the selected Naval Air Stations and limited duration of 
this study, certain constraints were imposed.  Naval Flight Officers were omitted because 
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of the observed lack of retention problems when compared to pilots (Cymrot, 1990).  
Since this study will examine retention in communities with the lowest retention, fixed 
wing aviators were chosen.  Both Lawry and Bookheimer that found propeller and jet 
pilots were more likely to leave the service than helicopter pilots or NFOs.  Finally to 
generate a representative cross section of fixed wing aircraft and to remain with in the 
three selected Naval Air Stations, aviators from five fixed wing platforms were selected 
for interviews:  F-14 Tomcat, F/A-18 Hornet, P-3C Orion, EA-6B Prowler, and E-2C 
Hawkeye. 
 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY  
The remainder of this thesis is organized into four chapters.  Chapter II reviews 
previous studies related to the research of military aviator retention.  Chapter III describes 
current retention data.  The first part of Chapter III analyzes recent trends in naval aviator 
retention.  The second part of Chapter III describes the Argus Career Milestone Tracking 
System as well as Argus data detailing current factors that affect retention.  Chapter IV 
discusses the interview process, the selection of the interviewees, and the information 
obtained from the interviews.  Lastly, Chapter V offers conclusions and presents 




























                                                                                       
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND SUMMARY 
 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many studies examine the complex issue of retention from different perspectives, 
however there has been little work devoted exclusively to the retention of naval aviators.  
Because the skills and experience of qualified naval aviators are in demand and hard to 
replace, naval aviator retention has provided policy makers with particular challenges. 
Of the research done on naval aviator retention, seven of the works are reviewed 
below.  These studies include analysis of both economic and non-economic factors.  The 
studies can be divided into three categories, focusing on different factors:  job satisfaction 
issues, economic factors affecting aviator retention, and bonus implementation studies. 
  B. STUDIES OF JOB SATISFACTION ISSUES  
1. Daniel J. Sullivan, “Job Satisfaction Among United States Navy 
and Marine Corps Aviation Officers – A Study of the Impact on 
Career Retention,”  Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 
1998 
 
This study used a statistical model to examine and predict aviator retention 
behavior.  A one-page survey was developed to measure job satisfaction and then 
administered to a large group of aviators.  While not specifically stated, this survey was 
administered prior to the study publication data of September, 1998.  Due to 
deployments, the sample group used was not a demographically representative group of 
Navy and Marine Corps aviators, however the results were weighted to give a more 
representative outcome.  Training-command and non-flying-command aviators were not 
used.  A total of 1,669 active duty aviators provided the sample group for the statistical 
analysis of the survey results. 
The expected findings were that higher levels of the “pay satisfaction” factor 
would correlate directly with the intent to stay in the naval service.  High levels of 
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“organizational satisfaction” in the Navy and Marine Corps were also predicted to 
positively correlate to intent to stay in the service. 
A logistic regression model was run using as the dependent variable a binary 
variable reflecting one’s desire to stay in the service.  The independent variables included 
among others, rank, age, aircraft type, marital status, source of commission, designation 
(pilot or NFO), and flight hours obtained.   
The statistical analysis of the results showed that “age and aircraft-type variables 
best differentiate all aviators.”  Because of the high correlation between age and rank of 
pilots, Sullivan found that “age and rank can be used interchangeably in the analysis.”  
An aviator’s specific aircraft community was also an important factor in the statistical 
model for determining intent to leave the service.   The model predicted that for junior 
aviators in the O3 (Lieutenant) pay grade, little statistical evidence existed that changing 
variables in any combination would have much effect on the desire to leave the service, 
except in specific platform communities that are well manned and not experiencing a 
decrease in flight time.  In those communities changes in “Pay” and “Organizational 
Satisfaction Issues” can have a positive effect on retention.  This means that within 
specific platform communities, if there is adequate manning and ample chance for pilots 
to fly, then “Pay” and “Organizational Satisfaction Issues” can have an effect.  In 
platforms that are undermanned and experiencing a decrease in flight time, there is little 
effect on retention by changing other variables.  Sullivan found that in ranks other than 
O-3, “aircraft type is the prime factor which delineates ‘leavers’ from ‘stayers’.”  For 
other than O-3s, helicopter pilots had the best chance to remain in the Navy. 
The survey showed responses to different questions by all aviators.  When asked 
about their feelings toward job “fulfillment/challenge,” the aviators surveyed gave this 
reason their highest positive feelings to remain in the Navy.  The level of 
“camaraderie/esprit de corps” was the second highest positive level of job satisfaction.  
The highest level of discontent was shown in the question about the “current value of 
eventual retirement benefits.”  The question of “adequacy of temporary duty 
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compensation/reimbursement” showed the second highest level of discontent among 
aviators.  Another negative response that was noted by Sullivan was “length of working 
hours.”   
In open-ended questions, over twenty-five percent of aviators gave work 
satisfaction reasons for desiring to leave the service.  These reasons included “low flight 
hours (or an inappropriate amount of work),” “inadequate resources (aircraft, parts, 
manning, etc.) to complete work,” and an “unfavorable mix of flying versus collateral 
duties.”  Over twenty-five percent of the respondents said they were expected to have 
“unreasonable amount of time away from home” and listed that as one of the four top 
reasons to leave the service. 
In the same open-ended questions, the most prominent responses for reasons to 
remain in the service were “fun and exciting work,” “challenging work,” and “rewarding 
and worthwhile work.”  Sullivan also noted that “aviators commonly identified 
satisfaction issues with their co-workers as a significant reason why they would stay in 
the service.” 
One last important piece of information found by Sullivan in the demographics 
section of his survey was the level of spousal education.    Sullivan expressed surprise to 
see that over fifty percent of the aviators’ spouses had college degrees with an additional 
twenty percent having some post-graduate education.  He also found that the “level of 
education among aviator spouses may be increasing.”  He theorized that higher level of 
education among spouses may correlate to a high earning potential and therefore may add 
to a lower level of job satisfaction for the aviator at every relocation. 
 
2. R. Gordon Lawry II, “A Statistical Analysis of the Effect of Flight 
Time on Naval Aviator Retention,” Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, September 1993 
 
This research investigated the relationship between flight time and the retention of 
naval aviators.  Flight time in this study is the total number of flight hours flown by the 
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pilots in the first five years as an aviator.  This study hypothesized that there is an 
inversely proportional relationship between a propeller pilot’s flight time and retention, 
while there is a directly proportional relationship between jet and helicopter pilot flight 
time and retention.  Flying in the propeller communities, the study reasoned, is much 
closer to airline flying and therefore more readily transferable to the civilian sector.  It is 
hypothesized that a propeller pilot’s principal objective may be to gain flight time in 
order to become a commercial pilot, thus the more flight hours the pilot accumulates, the 
more likely to leave the service.  The study also hypothesizes that helicopter and jet pilot 
flight time is not as theoretically transferable to commercial airline flying resulting in a 
lower chance of being hired for commercial airlines. This makes flight time more 
intrinsically important so more flight time leads to greater military job satisfaction and 
therefore the desire to remain in the service.   
The data were derived from three different sources.  Flight hours were obtained 
from the Navy Safety Center’s records of aviator flight hours.  These data were then 
matched with social security numbers to the Defense Manpower Data Center’s Officer 
Master File and Loss File (OMF).   The merged data were then verified against the Naval 
Personnel Research and Development Center’s database.  After eliminating non-standard 
data points, 3,225 observations remained from fiscal years 1980 through 1992.   
Data from the Future Airline Professionals of America were used for airline 
wages, while airline hiring data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics.  
Because of this new dataset, the analysis was limited to aviators whose first voluntary 
chance to exit the service occurred on or after 1985.  With the new information, the 
observations were now limited to 3,023 aviators.  The group was then broken into the 
three major aviation communities, jet, propeller, and helicopter, to mitigate differences 
between each community’s retention.  
 The analysis focused on whether naval aviators would leave or stay at the end of 
their Minimum Service Requirement (MSR), which is the first opportunity for voluntary 
separation.  A binomial multivariate analysis was used to determine if flight time was 
more or less likely to determine retention among the three different aviation sub-
communities.  The independent variables were the total number of flight hours flown by 
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the pilots in the first five years as an aviator, the average annual starting salary for the 
major airlines, and the number of pilots hired by the airlines, as well as the binary 
demographic information as to whether the pilot was single or married, did or did not 
have children, and was or was not a Caucasian. 
 This study found that propeller pilots were the most likely to leave the Navy with 
increasing flight time but, contrary to his expectations, jet pilots were also more likely to 
leave the Navy with an increase in flight time.  A possible explanation presented is that 
jet and propeller pilots both flew planes similar to commercial aircraft making them more 
readily adaptable to airline flying and therefore more desired by the airlines.  It is also 
explained if fixed wing pilots in general have some self-selection bias.  This bias could 
result from individuals who want to become commercial pilots choosing to fly a fixed 
wing (propeller or jet) platform in order to become a commercial pilot.  No statistical 
significance was found for flight time as a predictor of helicopter retention.  The analysis 
also found that civilian airline hiring was a significant factor affecting retention among 
all aviators. 
 
C. STUDIES OF ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING RETENTION 
3. William R. Bookheimer, “Predicting Naval Aviator Attrition Using 
Economic Data,” Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 1996 
 
In this study, Bookheimer asked the following research questions: 
• Can a model be built, using economic indicators and other information 
available to planner, to accurately predict naval aviator retention? 
 




The study used economic data (and specifically incorporates airline hiring as an 
economic factor related to Naval aviators) to help predict retention in junior aviators, 
with between 5 and 12 years of service. 
 The study used aggregated data from a database created from the Officer Master 
File maintained at the Defense Manpower Data Center.  Pilots under obligated service of 
various types were eliminated from the data set.  The aviators included in the data were 
past their Minimum Obligated Service (MOS) and before their 12 years of service (YOS) 
mark for fiscal years 1978 through 1990.   
 The dependent variable selected for the statistical analysis is the attrition rate for 
pilots.  The sample selected was subdivided into three general platforms that the aviators 
flew (propellers, jets, and helicopters), each broken down into 5-8 YOS and 9-12 YOS.  
Each of the six groups was analyzed separately.  The independent variables were national 
and professional unemployment rates, a composite index of leading economic indicators, 
the airline hiring status, and airline-to-military pay ratio. 
 Three regression models were used on the data.  The results showed that no single 
model was best for all six groups.  The models yielded the following information: 
• A univariate regression model using the national unemployment rate as the 
prediction factor was the model that most effectively predicted attrition of jet 
and propeller pilots with YOS 5-8.  The data showed that the higher the 
unemployment rate, the lower was pilot attrition. 
 
• Attrition rates for YOS 5-8 and YOS 9-12 were substantially different.  YOS 
5-8 had the highest attrition. 
 
• The national unemployment rate had a negative effect on attrition rates and 
was the strongest and most consistent predictor of pilot attrition. 
 
• Airline hiring rates and changes in airline hiring did not have a noticeable 




4. Claire Mitchell Levy, “The Civilian Airline Industry’s Role in 
Military Pilot Retention”  RAND Corp.,  1995 
Levy (1995) found a perception by military aviators that the civilian airline sector 
experienced less hardship in both time away from home and amount of work.  While exit 
surveys of Air Force pilots showed that airline hiring was the number one motivator for 
leaving the service on exit surveys, naval aviators cited family separation as the leading 
factor.  With the potential for a large increase in salary as a civilian underscoring the 
belief that airlines draw away military pilots, the military has seen the airlines as a major 
obstacle toward military aviator retention. 
This analysis examined the historical connection between airline hiring and 
military retention.  While definite periods of time existed where civilian airline hiring 
increased while military retention decreased, periods of increased retention while the 
airlines were hiring also existed.  In 1977 and in 1983, for example, airline hiring went 
dramatically up and military retention dropped.  The inverse happened in 1979 when the 
airlines decreased hiring and military aviation retention increased.  However, there have 
been times that airline hiring and military retention rose and fell together.  From 1980 to 
1983, airline hiring and military aviator retention rose together, while between 1985 to 
1988 airline hiring and military aviator retention decreased simultaneously. 
As this study points out, airline hiring is not the sole reason responsible for 
decreases in military aviator retention; therefore policies affecting military retention need 
to be addressed.  “Clearly, other factors, such as military career opportunity, time 
separated from families, and overall morale can and do have significant impact on the 
retention of military pilots.  Time and effort should be given to examining the effects of 
these other factors on the retention of military pilots.” (Levy, 1995) 
D. STUDIES OF BONUS PROGRAMS FOR AVIATOR RETENTION 
5. H. E. Mills, “An Analysis of the Effect of Aviator Career 
Continuation Pay (ACCP) Using an Annualized Cost of Leaving 




Using an Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model, Mills (1999) analyzed the 
effect of introducing the proposed Aviator Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) bonus 
program in 1998 for the retention of naval aviators.  The Aviation Continuation Program 
(ACP) program targeted aviators in different sub-communities based the level of 
retention in that sub-community.  This resulted in the ACP program giving a different 
amount of monetary bonus to aviators based on their designator, pilot or NFO, and on the 
type of aircraft flown.  The bonus was geared toward keeping pilots with the lowest 
retention rates in their individual communities. 
In 1999, the current ACCP program began, which only separates bonuses by 
designator (pilot and NFO) and not by aircraft flown.   
The study had two research goals: 
• Develop an ACOL model for aviators eligible for bonus payments under the 
ACP program.  Determine from the models of ACOL factors the monetary 
equivalent preference for remaining in the military. 
• Develop a logit retention model from the critical monetary equivalent ACOL 
factor and dependent data to predict the effect of ACCP on aviator retention. 
 
The study used data from the Department of Defense Manpower Data Center’s 
Officer Master Files integrated with data from the Naval Military Personnel Command 
regarding officers who had received an ACP bonus.  Data were limited to fiscal years that 
ACP was in effect: 1990 to 1997.   
The analysis looked at four different points at which an aviator may leave the 
service: the 9, 11, 16, and 21 years-of-service mark.  These data points were examined 
through a regression model for naval aviation as a whole as well as for specific platform 
sub-community.   
The study found that ACCP is likely to increase aviator retention at the 11, 16, 
and 21 years-of-service mark.  The study also found the Annualized Cost of Leaving 
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amount proved to be a statistically significant factor in the retention decision, and yielded 
a 19.68 percent increase in the likelihood of aviator retention between 11 and 20 years-
of-service. 
 
6. Carol S. Moore and Henry S. Griffis, “Evaluating the Navy 
Aviation Career Continuation Pay Proposal,” Annotated Briefing, 
Center for Naval Analyses, February 1999 
 
This study by the Center for Naval Analyses analyzed the expected change in 
naval aviator retention due to the shift in aviator bonus programs.  ACP was being 
replaced by the new ACCP program, as noted above in the discussion of Mills.   
The ACP paid aviators based on the amount of the predicted department head tour 
shortages per promotion year group and platform.  Helicopter pilots, a group with a 
historically higher retention rate, did not receive bonuses while certain jet communities 
were eligible for as much as $25,000 a year.  One of the problems found was that some 
aviators who were taking the ACP bonus were not staying to the department head level; 
about 10-30 percent of those who took an ACP contract attrited from their aviation career 
before completing their department head tours.  The study also found that the incentive of 
a twenty-year retirement improved aviator retention after the department head tour.   
The new ACCP program differed in that it would pay a flat bonus rate to all 
aviators regardless of platform flown.  NFOs would also now get a bonus but at a lower 
level than Naval aviators.  Moore-Griffis (1999) analyzed the transition period following 
the conversion of ACP to ACCP.  The study assumed naval aviators based their decision 
to stay or leave on the present value of the bonus earnings that would be received from 
their minimum service requirement (MSR) until retirement.  The value of the bonus was 
the sum of all bonus money an aviator would make assuming he or she had maintained an 
ideal career path through the aviation community, i.e., department head, executive 
officer, and commanding officer.  Because the general training pipelines for the propeller, 
helicopter, and jet aircraft differ in length, the MSRs of these three groups are generally 
different.  As a result, jet pilots have a longer MSR than propeller or helicopter pilots; 
 17
therefore jet pilots are not eligible for as many years of bonus money, which reduces the 
overall worth of the ACCP bonus to jet pilots.  However, the study notes that feelings of 
inequality in bonus money can lead to reduced retention in communities that previously 
had good retention.  The study also incorporates a basic assumption about pilots’ 
perceptions of the worth of the bonus.  The assumption is that optimistic pilots see 
themselves adhering to a normal career path where they succeed in screening for 
command.  On the other hand, some pilots will have the expectation that they have only 
an average chance of screening for command and receiving all the bonus money 
associated.  Thus, optimistic pilots will value the ACCP more than aviators with average 
expectations.  
The analysis predicts the new policy will have little or no effect on jet pilot 
retention.  Because jet pilots already receive the most sizable bonus under the ACP 
program, they do not really expect an increase in offered bonus money under the new 
program.  The analysis also found that retention in the propeller, helicopter, and NFO 
communities would increase significantly because they were going from no bonus or low 
bonus conditions to the much higher ACCP bonus.  This was actually stated as a short-
term solution for propeller and helicopter retention.  If retention continued to become a 
larger problem, paying increasingly higher bonuses could become necessary.  It was 
possible then that ACCP would initially cost between $1.5 and $7.5 million more 
annually without increasing the retention in the jet community.   
Moore-Griffis (1999) predictions appear to be borne out by results, as will be seen 
in chapter 3.  Jet pilot retention has increased little since ACCP has been implemented, 
but retention of other pilots has risen sharply. 
 
7. Carol S. Moore, “Ideas for the Marine Corps Aviation Retention 
Bonus Program,” Annotated Briefing, Center for Naval Analysis, 
July 1999  
 
The Marine Corps does not operate under the Navy bonus system.  Between fiscal 
years 1990 and 1996 the Marine Corps offered a six thousand dollar contract to pilots in 
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communities with pilot shortages, while at the same time the Navy was offering up to $12 
thousand a year in ACP bonuses.  In fiscal year 1997, the Marine Corps began offering 
$12 thousand a year bonuses to match the other services.  With the changes to the law 
allowing service branches to increase aviation bonuses to $25 thousand a year (ACCP for 
the Navy), the Marine Corps wanted the answers to two questions:     
1. What years of service should be targeted with a bonus and at what level? 
2. What are the bonus levels needed to meet retention goals for each platform? 
Moore (1999) shows that the Marine Corps was only at 72 percent of FY-00 
requirements for fixed wing pilots while at the same time was at 150 percent of 
requirements for NFOs.  The study suggests that the surge in civilian airline hiring has 
prompted the need for re-examining retention bonuses.   
  Aviators were found to have the “greatest risk of leaving” during the years the 
following their initial commitment incurred from pilot training, usually YOS 7-10.  The 
data contained several year groups and training pipelines that had varying durations, 
leading to different lengths of initial commitments.  The study also found that for Marine 
Corps pilots, while retention remained low through YOS 13, after that there were 
minimal losses.  The study suggests then that bonuses are not needed after the rank of O-
4.  
 Like Navy ACP, the Marine Corps used individual communities of aircraft type to 
target bonuses based on that community’s specific retention needs.  The study uses a 
statistical model to predict bonus levels for specific platform communities.  FY-97 data 
were the most recent year of complete data available at the time of the study.  The FY-97 
data were used for the Cumulative Continuation Rate of 7 to 14 years, the time after 
pilots complete their initial commitment through the O-4 rank.   
   The model predicted that there were very apparent differences in the amount of 
bonus necessary for retention targets for separate communities based on platform and 
designator (pilot or NFO).  F/A-18 Pilots would need the largest bonuses followed by the 
other fixed wing Marine Corps platforms, with either a very small to no bonus offered for 
the different helicopter platforms.  The NFOs were also found to not need a bonus for 
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targeted retention.  The model showed that the Marine Corps would need to spend almost 
six million dollars per year over the next several years to eliminate current shortages. 
 The main conclusion of the study was that different communities would require 
varying bonuses in order to meet their requirements.  Annual bonuses of not less than 
$16,000 for fixed wing, and no greater than $6,000 for rotary wing pilots were 
recommended.  The study did not recommend bonuses for NFOs at all.  Instead of going 
to a standard across-the-board bonus, the study recommends using the savings “toward 
supporting aviation equipment and supply readiness—a step that could also improve 
aviator retention.” (Moore, 1999) 
 Because the Marine Corps places a lot of value on equality, it has decided not to 
separate the bonus by aircraft type and has since increased the bonus based on type of 
general platform type.  Fixed wing aviators currently receive $12,000 a year and rotary 
wing aviators receive $9,000 a year.   
 
E. LITERATURE SUMMARY 
A number of approaches for analyzing naval aviator retention have been 
attempted.  Bookheimer (1996) and Levy (1995) focused primarily on using economic 
issues to predict aviator retention.  They found that indeed the general U.S. economy and 
the status of airline hiring and pay play a role in an aviator’s decision to stay or leave the 
Navy.  The studies by Mills (1999), Moore and Griffis (1999), and Moore (1999), 
focused on the impact of monetary bonuses on aviator retention.  All of the studies found 
that bonus programs had a positive effect on retention.  The problem is that bonus 
programs are expensive and cannot seem to consistently solve all the retention problems 
in the different aviation communities.  Moore and Griffis (1999) and Moore (1999) 
suggest when bonuses are targeted at certain low retention aviation communities, this 
causes a feeling of inequality within communities that had good retention.   Conversely, a 
bonus program like ACCP aimed across the board to provide equality can increase the 
total bonus cost to the Navy but not improve retention to communities that were low in 
retention and already receiving the bonus.  Moore and Griffis (1999) found the ACCP 
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program would likely require up to $7.5 million more annually than ACP without 
increasing the retention rate in the jet community.   
The study by Sullivan (1998) goes beyond economic situations and bonus 
programs and uses a survey of aviators to examine job satisfaction indicators of retention.  
After collecting survey data, he used a statistical model to predict aviator retention.  
Sullivan (1998) examined aviators from all points in their careers, he did not look 
specifically at junior officer aviators that were approaching the end of their initial 
commitment, the time they are most likely to leave the service (Moore, 1999).  For this 
group he concluded that “once in pay grade O3 few variables, in any combination, 
diminish the intent to leave.”  (Sullivan, 1998)    
Most of the studies have broken the data into groups either by platform type 
(propellers, helicopters, or jets) or by actual platforms (i.e., F-14, F/A-18, P-3, etc.).  The 
Sullivan (1998), Bookheimer (1996), Lawry(1993), and Moore and Griffis (1999) studies 
all found that retention differed by platform type.  Sullivan and Mills both found that 
specific aircraft type (i.e., F-14, F/A-18, P-3, etc.) was an important factor in predicting 
aviator retention. 
In summary, most of the literature has focused on the relationship between 
monetary compensation and retention.  While compensation is important, other factors 
also play a role in retention, as Sullivan (1999) and Lawry (1993) show.  This study is 
concerned with many of those other factors.  Here the focus is on junior officer aviators 
who are at or approaching the end of their initial commitment to the Navy because they 
are the most likely to leave the service (Moore, 1999).  Like Sullivan (1999), this analysis 
concentrates on job satisfaction issues, but unlike his study that was based on a survey, 
this study utilizes current data from the Navy’s new Argus Career Tracking and 
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III.  AVIATION RETENTION DATA AND DATA FROM THE     
ARGUS CAREER MILESTONES TRACKING SYSTEM 
This chapter first examines the retention in the naval aviation community.  
Secondly, the Argus Career Milestone Tracking system is explained.  Third, the results of 
the Argus data are examined for factors affecting the retention of junior officer fixed 
wing aviators. 
 
A. CURRENT RETENTION 
Cumulative Continuation Rates (CCRs) measure the propensity of aviators in 
their seventh year of service to remain on active duty at the end of their twelfth year of 
service, which roughly corresponds to the end of their department head tour.  Appendix 
A, Table A.1 shows the Cumulative Continuation Rates for all aviators from fiscal year 
1985 through fiscal year 2000.  These data are unpublished and were obtained from the 
Aviation Community Manager’s Office.  The data are in percentage form and therefore 
the actual number of officers for each year is unavailable.   
It is important to note that in 1989, changes to legislation resulted in an increase 
in the minimum obligated service (MOS) for aviators.  The MOS is the commitment 
incurred after completing aviation training and receiving wings.  This obligated service 
increased to six years for NFOs, seven years for propeller and helicopter pilots, and eight 
years for jet pilots.  Because of this, seven years later, in 1996, there appears to be an 
increase in the CCR for pilots.  This increase is artificially driven by the increase in 
minimum obligated service (McKenzie, 1999).   
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Looking at the historical retention averages in Table 1, several factors can be 
noted. 
Table 1.  Historical Cumulative Continuation Rate Averages  
for Fiscal Years 1985-2000 
 





ALL PILOTS 36.60 
JET PILOTS 36.61 
PROP PILOTS 24.72 
HELO PILOTS 48.31 
  
ALL NFOS 46.80 
JET NFOS 47.10 
PROP NFOS 45.74 
       SOURCE:  Office of Naval Aviation Community Manager 
When comparing pilots to NFOs a very distinct difference can be seen.  As has 
been noted some years ago in the literature (Cymrot, 1989), pilots have a much lower 
retention average compared to NFOs.  As shown in Table 1, pilots have averaged a ten 
percent lower retention rate compared to NFOs over a 16 year period.  This difference 
remains when comparing Pilots and NFOs from the same general community.  Jet pilots 
had a 36.61 percent retention average whereas their jet NFO counter parts had a 47.1 
percent retention average.  Similarly, over the same time period, propeller pilots had a 
24.72 percent average retention while propeller NFOs had 45.74 percent retention.   
Over the same time period, helicopter pilots, who are the only major aviation 
community without NFOs, had a 48.31 percent average retention, which puts their 
historical retention at about the same level as the NFO community.   It has been noted 
that the option of leaving the Navy for the commercial airlines is generally more open to 
fixed wing aviators, jet and propeller communities, due to the experience gained and 
similarity to fixed wing aircraft flown by the airlines (Lawry, 1993). 
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Lastly, it must be noted that there is a large historical disparity among the three 
major naval aviation communities.  The helicopter community has the highest retention 
average of 48.31 percent and at almost 12 percent less is the jet community with 36.61 
percent retention.  This is still much higher than the propeller community, which has a 
24.72 percent historical retention CCR, almost 12 percent below the jet community.1   
Because fixed wing aviation, the jet and propeller communities, have the lowest 
historical retention, Table 2 shows the historical retention among the five fixed wing 
communities,  two propeller (VP and VAW) and three jet (VFA, VF, and VAQ) that will 
be examined throughout this thesis.   
Table 2.  Historical Pilot Cumulative Continuation Rate Averages by 








VFA (F/A-18) 41.15 
VF (F-14) 37.10 
VAQ (EA-6B) 43.35 
VAW (E-2C) 30.71 
VP (P-3) 24.27 
       SOURCE:  Office of Naval Aviation Community Manager 
Among the five fixed wing platforms, there is a wide variety of historical 
retention averages.  It is noticeable that the two propeller platforms, the VP (P-3) and 
VAW (E-2C), have the lowest historical retention of the five.  All three jet platforms 
examined have higher retention averages.  What is important here is that there are 
retention disparities between aviators of different platforms within the fixed wing 
aviation community. 
                                                 
1 Note that the jet retention is higher than the propeller retention by almost the 
same amount that the helicopter retention is to the jet retention.  Lowery (1993) 
hypothesizes that propeller pilots may self select propellers in order to obtain the 
experience necessary to become commercial aviators, thus establishing a selection bias 
between jet and propeller pilots in the fixed wing aviation community.  
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  Even in more recent years, the disparities in CCRs are evident.  Table 3 shows 
the CCRs for the years of 1998-2000. 
Table 3.  Pilot Cumulative Continuation Rate Averages by Aircraft 





 FISCAL YEAR 98 99 2000 
   
PILOT    
VFA (F/A-18) 40 40 37.35 
VF (F-14) 45 36 58.02 
VAQ (EA-6B) 60 58 62.73 
VAW (E-2C) 20 20 42.81 
VP (P-3) 19 16 32.53 
SOURCE:  Office of Naval Aviation Community Manager 
In all three years, there are large differences in CCRs between platforms.  These 
differences may have many explanations.  There are economic factors as those looked at 
by Bookheimer, Mills, Moore and Griffis.  However, factors such as civilian 
unemployment rates presumably affect all pilots, and factors such as airline hiring and 
airline salaries affect all fixed wing pilots.  Only fixed wing communities are represented 
in Table 3.  Thus, these economic factors are unlikely to be the key explanations for the 
differences in retention rates.  The bonus program is also an economic factor here.  The 
ACP program, which was in effect for 1998 and 1999, selectively targeted certain 
platforms with different levels of money.  However, the ACCP program in place in 2000 
offers the same bonus equally to all aviators.  As predicted in the bonus studies, 
communities that did not previously have a large bonus had a dramatic increase in 
retention (VP and VAW), while communities that were already receiving the bonus had 
little change (VFA and VAQ) (Moore and Griffis, 1999).  Interestingly, the VF pilot 
community, which from FY 1995 to FY 1998 was eligible for the same bonus as the VFA 
pilot community (Mills, 1999), saw a dramatic increase in retention in FY 2000, leading 
to the conclusion that there must be some other factor affecting VF community retention.  
In summary, bonuses and other economic factors do not provide a full explanation for 
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retention disparities between aviators of different platforms within the fixed wing 
aviation community.  Other platform specific factors are worth exploring. 
 
B. ARGUS CAREER MILESTONES TRACKING SYSTEM 
 The Argus Career Milestones Tracking System is a branching, web-based survey.  
Argus went online via the internet in February of 2001.  OPNAV Instruction 1040.10 (7 
May 01) states: 
Retention of quality trained personnel is paramount to the future of Navy.  
Information on influences affecting retention behavior must be gathered and 
analyzed to support compensation, personnel, and policy decisions.  Argus has 
been developed to gather specific data from Navy personnel at important 
milestones and to provide Navy leadership with Fleet direct information to 
influence future quality of service improvements back to the members. 
 
The Argus survey is directed at both enlisted sailors and naval officers to gather 
information that will be useful in shaping polices that will affect retention.  In OPNAV 
Instruction 1040.11 (29 May 01), which is the outline for the Navy Retention Program, 
Naval Personnel Command, NAVPERSCOM (PERS-00R), is given the responsibility to 
“collect and analyze Argus Career Milestone Tracking System data” and then 
“disseminate processed data to Fleet/Echelon 2 commanders with subsequent proposed 
program/policy changes as required.”   
 Argus replaced the Navy exit survey, which was administered to service members 
departing from the Navy.  This previous exit surveys had only about nine percent 
participation, providing very limited data on causes of attrition.  This survey also gave no 
data for those who had chosen throughout different career points to remain in the Navy.  
Thus there was no way to compare the data from those staying to those leaving. 
 Argus is designed to provide career decision information about both people 
choosing to leave and to stay in the Navy.  Argus focuses on what factors are influencing 
someone’s decision to stay in or leave the Navy instead of on his/her satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction.  This is accomplished by tracking an individual’s career decisions at 
transition points throughout his/her career (NPRST, 8 January, 2000).  OPNAV 
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Instruction 1040.10 (7 May 01) states that all Navy commands will offer, not require, 
their assigned personnel the opportunity to complete the Argus questionnaire at these 
milestones for officer careers: 
• Acceptance of promotion 
• Execution of PCS orders (completed at departing command) 
• Resignation 
• Completion of active duty service obligation to include retirement 
• Separation from naval service (voluntary and involuntary) 
• Return to active duty 
• Change of status to and from limited duty 
• Transfer from active duty Naval Service to Naval Reserve, National guard, or 
another service 
• Or at Command discretion (Individual or command-wide basis) 
Because the Argus online questionnaire is branching, it changes based on the 
information and responses provided.  The Argus questionnaire structure can be broken up 
into four parts.  The first part is the demographics section.  Information from this section 
includes the unit identification code (UIC), social security number, which of the career 
milestones listed above was the reason for completing the survey, gender, marital status, 
number of children, race, pay grade, designator, and most importantly in this thesis, 
which community in the Navy the individual is currently serving in. 
When an aviator is asked which community he/she is serving in, the choices are: 
Unrestricted Line, Restricted Line, Staff, and Other.  Choosing unrestricted line brings up 
the choices:  Surface, Submarine, Aviation, Fleet Support, Special Operations, and 
Special Warfare.  Once the aviator chooses Aviation, the Aviation option branches out to 
the choices:  Fixed Wing Fighter, Fixed Wing Other, Rotary, and Other.  It is important 
to note that at this point there is no further branching.  The respondent is not asked to 
select an individual platform, nor to select pilot vs. NFO.  This means that to get separate 
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pilot and NFO information, the database has to be cross queried by both aviation 
subcategory and by designator.  With information on individual platforms, researchers 
could partition the data into any groups that were desired for study. 
The four communities under Aviation also lack clear definitions and the lack of 
definitions can mislead respondents to misclassify themselves.  One interpretation could 
be that only the F-14 and F/A-18 platforms fall under the Fixed Wing Fighter branch of 
Aviation.  This leaves all other fixed wing aviators to fall under the Fixed Wing Other 
category.  The Fixed Wing Other category is now a disproportionate amount of aviators 
and would include carrier based tactical jets (EA-6B, S-3), carrier based props (E-2C, C-
2), land based jets (E-6A) and land based props (P-3C, and EP-3).  Another possible 
interpretation is that both S-3 and EA-6B pilots, who are tactical carrier jet aviators, 
might select Fixed Wing Fighter as their category, leading to differences in classification 
of the same platform.  The selection Other is not defined at all.  The first three choices, 
Fixed Wing Fighter, Fixed Wing Other, and Rotary should encompass all current Navy 
platforms.  This makes the choice Other unnecessary.     
The second part of the Argus questionnaire asks the individual about key factors 
that would influence him/her to stay or leave the Navy.  Some of these topics include:  
promotion opportunities, career assignments, command climate, time away from home, 
current job satisfaction, impact on family, leadership, pay, and retirement.  Everyone 
answers the basic questions with a number from one to seven, with one being an 
influence to stay, four being neutral, and seven being an influence to leave.  If the 
individual answers with other than a neutral response, further branches of that question 
may be asked.  For each individual, Argus will automatically make a list of items that the 
individual has indicated is an influence on his/her decision to stay in or leave the Navy.  
The individual will then have the opportunity to select from the list up to the five most 
important issues to stay and then the five most important issues influencing him/her to 
leave the service.   
The third part of the Argus questionnaire asks the individual about his/her career 
intentions.  This includes:  civilian job opportunities, career commitment, and career 
information.  The last part of the survey is still be added.  It will be a section reserved for 
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“Hot Button Items.”  These questions can be inserted into the survey to ask about current 
topics.  (Argus Career Milestone Tracking System Briefing Outline, 2000)    
It is important to note that the Argus database is continually and automatically 
updated.  Using the social security number as a reference, it will update demographic and 
survey response information so that at any query, only the most recent responses of all 
users will be computed and factored into the analysis.  
  
C. ARGUS DATA 
When queried for certain demographic groups, Argus will generate two lists by 
frequency of response.  One list is the top 30 most important factors for the individual in 
the queried group to consider staying in the Navy, the other list is the top 30 most 
important factors influencing his/her decision to leave the Navy.  It is important to note 
that raw Argus survey data are not available for use, only the results.  This limits the 
analysis and does not allow for statistical analysis of the results, limiting the data 
available to the ordinal rankings of reasons to stay and reasons the leave the Navy for 
defined demographic groups. 
 The Argus results used in this study were obtained from the database on 16 
December, 2002.  These full lists can be found in Appendix B.  The first column labeled 
“all” shows, in the order of frequency, the top thirty most important influences to stay in 
or leave the Navy.  The following five columns are labeled zones A, B, C, D, and E.  
These zones represent the responses of the desired demographics with different Years of 
Service (YOS). 
• Zone A:  0-5 YOS 
• Zone B:  6-10 YOS 
• Zone C:  11-15 YOS 
• Zone D:  16-20 YOS 
• Zone E:  21+ YOS 
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 In this study, the Argus lists of reasons to stay in the Navy and reasons to leave 
the Navy are both examined to establish that as sub-communities are examined within 
larger communities, their priority of responses will change.  Since this study is examining 
the retention of junior fixed wing aviators, the Zone B group (YOS 6-10) is the primary 
focus because that is the group that holds the seven and eight YOS upon which the CCRs 
for aviation are based.  Three comparisons are made below.  The Zone B aviators’ 
reasons to consider leaving or staying in the Navy are compared with the reasons Argus 
has listed for all Zone B officers, and with senior (Zone C and Zone D) aviators.  Also, 
all aviators (Zones A through E) are compared with all Unrestricted Line (URL) Officers.  
URL officers are used because they are combat officers.  This group excludes medical 
officers, dental officers, Judge Advocate General officers, etc.  This leads to a group that 
is closer in mission focus for comparing reasons to leave or stay in the Navy.  Only the 
top ten reasons from the list of thirty generated by Argus are used here.  There are over 
ninety possible reasons that can be used.  A list of other Argus factors is contained in 
Appendix B.   
 Ideally, comparisons would be made between mutually exclusive groups, but 
unfortunately the data available do not permit the use of mutually exclusive groups in two 
of the three comparisons below.  Thus, it would be preferable to compare all aviators 
with all non-aviator URL officers, and all Zone B aviators with all Zone B non-aviators.  
In fact, all aviators are compared with all URL officers including aviators, and all Zone B 
aviators are compared with all Zone B URL officers including aviators.  Obiously, this 
means that differences in the priorities of responses between aviators and others are 
actually greater than is revealed by the tables below.  
 There are responses from 1613 unrestricted line officers in the Argus database.  
Of these responses, 490 are aviators.  It is important to point out that aviators represent 
both pilots and NFOs.  Respondents are asked to choose platform type:  Fixed Wing 
Fighter, Fixed Wing Other, Rotary, and Other.  Unfortunately with only 490 aviators 
(both pilots and NFOs), there were not enough data points for Argus to disaggregate stay 
and leave lists for these smaller sub-communities.   
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1. All Aviators vs. All Unrestricted Line Officers 
A comparison of the top ten reasons to leave the Navy between all aviators and all 
unrestricted line officers is shown in Table 4.  The 490 aviators are included in the group 
of 1613 unrestricted line officers.  The comparison between aviators and URL officers is 
important because differences between the two groups can give insight into their 
particular retention problems. 
Table 4.  Comparison of Argus Top 10 Reasons to Leave the Navy between All 
Aviators and all Unrestricted Line Officers 
 
All 
Aviators Reason to Leave 
All URL 
Officers 
   
1 Availability of supplies  1 
2 Trust Navy leadership  3 
3 Advancement/Promotion Opportunities  2 
4 Control over PCS assignments  6 
5 PCS moves on spouse career  11 
6 Red tape to do job  5 
7 Medical Care for family  15 
8 Impact of Navy on family  4 
9 Repair parts needed  26 
10 Separation from family/friends  9 
       SOURCE:  Argus Data, 16 December, 2002. 
Aviators and unrestricted line officers share the same top three reasons to leave 
the Navy as well as seven of the top ten.  However, “PCS moves on spouse career” is 
given as the number five reason to leave for aviators while it drops to eleven for all 
unrestricted line officers.  The most notable difference is that “repair parts needed” is 
number nine for aviators and drops all the way down to twenty-six for unrestricted line 
officers. 
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A comparison of top ten reasons to stay in the Navy for both aviators and 
unrestricted line officers is given in Table 5. 
Table 5.  Comparison of Argus Top 10 Reasons to Stay in the Navy between All 
Aviators and all Unrestricted Line Officers 
 
All 
Aviators Reason to Leave 
All URL 
Officers 
   
1 Current job satisfaction  1 
2 Job interest  4 
3 Family support  2 
4 Opp to work in primary rate/designator  10 
5 Camaraderie 8 
6 Senior officer leadership quality  5 
7 Advancement/Promotion Opportunities  3 
8 Level Responsibility  6 
9 Immediate supervisor leadership quality 7 
10 Unit morale  14 
       SOURCE:  Argus Data, 16 December, 2002. 
While nine of the top ten reasons to stay for aviators and unrestricted line officers 
are the same, a difference between the two groups of officers can be seen.  The biggest 
difference is that “opportunity to work in primary rate/designator” is the number four 
reasons to remain in the Navy for aviators while that drops to number ten for all 
unrestricted line officers.  This reason as well as “current job satisfaction” and “job 
interest” show that one of a pilot’s prime reasons to remain in the Navy is the ability to 
continue flying. 
It is apparent from the Argus database that as the sub-communities of larger 
groups are examined, changes in the priorities of reasons, or the reasons themselves, to 
leave or stay in the Navy, can change. 
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2. Comparison Between Junior Officers YOS 6-10 
There may be problems unique to junior officer aviators.  By holding junior 
officers constant, a comparison between junior officer aviators and other junior officers 
can be made.  Below is Table 6, which shows the top ten reasons to leave the Navy for 
junior officer aviators (YOS 6-10) compared to the larger groups that they are a part of, 
the junior officer line officers (YOS 6-10) and all junior officer (YOS 6-10).   
 
Table 6.  Comparison of Argus Reasons to Leave Among Junior Officer Aviators 





Line Officer All Junior Officers
YOS (6-10)  Reason to Leave YOS (6-10) YOS (6-10)
     
1  Availability of supplies  1 1
2  Trust Navy leadership  2 2
3  Red tape to do job  5 4
4  PCS moves on spouse career  11 9
5  Repair parts needed  16 .
6  Number personnel  22 18
7  Senior officer leadership quality  7 5
8  Control over PCS assignments  4 6
9  Impact of location on spouse career 26 23
10  Respect Navy leadership  13 17
SOURCE:  Argus Data, 16 December, 2002. 
 
It can be seen that availability of supplies is the number-one reason most junior 
officers think about leaving the service.  Trust in Navy leadership is across the board the 
number-two reason for junior officers to consider leaving the service.  Junior officer 
aviators and junior URL officers only share five of the same top ten reasons to leave the 
Navy.  Interestingly, the number-four reason for junior officers to leave the service is that 
PCS moves have a negative effect on spouses’ careers.  This is only the number-eleven 
reason for Unrestricted Line junior officers and number-nine for all junior officers.  The 
number-nine reason for a junior officer aviator is the impact of location on his/her 
spouse’s career which is only number twenty six for unrestricted line junior officers and 
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number twenty-three for all junior officers.  This suggests that the Navy’s impact on a 
spouse’s career is more of a factor for aviators than for non aviator junior officers. 
Another important fact to note is that while repair parts needed is the number-five 
reason for junior officer aviators to think about leaving, it drops to number fifteen for 
unrestricted line junior officers and is not even in the top thirty reasons for all junior 
officers.  This indicates that naval aviators feel a lack of parts is a much greater problem 
in the aviation community than other officers feel it is in their communities.  Along the 
same lines, the number-six reason to leave for junior officer aviators is lack of personnel.  
This again is only number twenty two for junior unrestricted line officers and number 
eighteen for all officers, again showing that aviators feel a lack of personnel in the 
aviation community is a problem that is not necessarily an issue for other communities.  
Table 7 shows the top ten reasons to Stay in the Navy for junior officer aviators 
(YOS 6-10) compared to the larger groups of which they are a part, the junior officer line 
officers (YOS 6-10) and all junior officer (YOS 6-10). 
Table 7.  Comparison of Argus Reasons to Stay in the Service Among Junior Officer 
Aviators (YOS 6-10) and All Junior Officers (YOS 6-10) 
 
Junior Officer   Unrestricted All 





YOS (6-10)  Reason to Stay YOS (6-10) YOS (6-10)
    
1  Camaraderie 4 4
2  Current job satisfaction  1 1
3  Job interest  6 5
4  Opp to work in primary rate/designator  3 3
5  Senior officer leadership quality  2 9
6  Level Responsibility  8 7
7  Level job challenge  12 13
8  Family support  5 6
9  Availability of detailer  16 25
10  PCS to jobs in good location  18 22
SOURCE:  Argus Data, 16 December, 2002. 
 
Examining the reasons to stay for junior officers, there appears to be much less 
diversity compared to reasons to leave the service.  Both junior URL officer and all junior 
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officers share seven of the top ten reasons to stay in the Navy with junior officer aviators.  
However, “camaraderie” is the number-one reason junior officer aviators gave as a 
reason to stay while the unrestricted line officers as well as all junior naval officers (both 
of which the junior officer aviators are a part) only ranked it as the number-four reason to 
stay.  This was also found by Sullivan (1998) in his study to be one of the most important 
reasons for an aviator to stay in the service.    
The number-nine and number-ten reasons to stay in the Navy are significantly 
different for junior officer aviators than for the larger groups.  The number-nine reason to 
stay is “availability of detailer” while for URL junior officers this was number sixteen 
and number twenty-five for all junior officers.  This would indicate that aviators feel that 
they have an easier time with detailer issues than other non-aviator junior officers.  
Similarly, the number-ten reason to stay in the Navy for junior aviators is “PCS jobs in 
good locations.”  The other two groups are eighteen and twenty two respectively.  A 
problem exists that the reason to leave “Impact of Location on Spouse’s Career” in 
contradictory to the reason to stay in the Navy “PCS jobs in good locations.”  This 
problem could be because, as previously discussed, aviators are divided into sub-
communities by platform flown.  Different platforms are consolidated at different 
locations.  The majority of Navy EA-6B Prowlers are flown out of N.A.S. Whidbey 
Island in Washington state.  All Navy F/A-18 Hornets are flown out of N.A.S. Leemore 
California or N.A.S. Oceana Virginia.  All Navy F-14 Tomcats are flown only out of 
N.A.S. Oceana Virginia, etc.  Because of these centralized locations, there is much less 
diversity in possible duty assignments than for other naval officers.  Without being able 
to examine platform communities of the aviators in Argus, it is difficult to know if certain 
duty stations are more preferable than others.  If aviators from preferred Naval Air 







3. Comparison of Junior and Senior Aviators 
There may be problems unique to junior officer aviators not shared by more 
senior aviators.  Below is Table 8, which shows the top-ten reasons to Leave the Navy for 
junior officer aviators (YOS 6-10) compared to more senior aviators (YOS 11-15 and 
YOS 16-20). 
Table 8.  Comparison of Argus Reasons to Leave Among Aviators (YOS 6-
10) and Senior Aviators (YOS 10-20) 
 
Aviators     
YOS (6-10)   YOS (11-15) YOS (16-20)
  Reason to Leave 
     
1  Availability of supplies  1 1
2  Trust Navy leadership  9 10
3  Red tape to do job  31 4
4  PCS moves on spouse career  14 3
5  Repair parts needed  4 12
6  Number personnel  . 42
7  Senior officer leadership quality  10 29
8  Control over PCS assignments  3 15
9  Impact of location on spouse career  15 46
10  Respect Navy leadership  43 53
       SOURCE:  Argus Data, 16 December, 2002. 
Clearly the largest difference in the comparison is that junior aviators YOS 6-10 
share only five of their top ten reasons with the top ten reasons for senior aviators YOS 
16-20.  In fact, of the top ten reasons to leave the Navy, only numbers one, two, three and 
four make the top ten list of the senior aviators YOS 16-20.  In fact, four of the top ten 
reasons to leave for junior aviators YOS 6-10 were below number 29 on the list of 
reasons to leave for senior aviators YOS 16-20.  Similarly to the reasons to leave for all 
junior officers, senior aviators feel that “availability of supplies” is the number-one 
reason to leave the service.  Even more noticeable is that “number of personnel” is the 
number-six reason to leave the service for junior officer aviators even though more senior 
aviators (YOS 11-15) did not cite that reason often enough to make the Argus list and the 
very senior aviators (YOS 16-20) ranked this as number forty-two.  Sullivan also found 
that lack of supplies and personnel were factors in the decision to leave the service 
(Sullivan, 1998). 
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Navy leadership also appears to be a point of contention between junior officer 
aviators and senior officer aviators.  “Trust in Navy Leadership” is shown as the number-
two reason for leaving the service for junior officer aviators (YOS 5-10) but that number 
drops to nine for aviators with YOS 11-15 and to number-ten for aviators with YOS 16-
20.  “Senior officer leadership quality” is the number-seven Argus reason for leaving the 
service among aviators YOS 6-10, while that number falls to ten for aviators YOS 11-15 
and number twenty-nine for aviators YOS 16-20.  Even worse is that “respect for Navy 
leadership” is the number-ten reason given by junior aviators for leaving the service 
while aviators with YOS 11-15 ranked it as the number forty-three reasons and aviators 
with YOS 16-20 ranked it as fifty-three.  All of these disparities could be explained by 
the fact YOS 11-15 is the group becoming the “Navy Leadership” in question and that 
YOS 16-20 is the “Navy Leadership.” 
The number-three reason for junior officer aviators to leave the Navy is “Red tape 
to do job.”  This reason drops all the way to thirty-one for aviators YOS 11-15.   
Lastly, a junior aviator’s spouse’s career appears to be a very important factor in 
the decision to stay or leave.  In reasons to leave the service, junior officer aviators (YOS 
6-10) ranked the effects of “PCS moves on spouse career” fourth and the negative 
“impact of location on spouse career” ninth.  By comparison aviators with YOS 11-15 
“PCS moves on spouse career” dropped to fourteenth.  Similarly, “impact of location on 
spouse career” dropped to number forty-three for aviators YOS 11-15 and number fifty-
three for aviators YOS 16-20.  The reason for the drop in more senior aviators may be 
that as an aviator becomes more senior and achieves higher rank, the aviator makes 
correspondingly more pay and therefore the loss of a more lucrative spouse’s career 
becomes less important.  This information correlates with Sullivan’s (1998) findings that 
aviators’ spouses are achieving higher levels of education and therefore are able to secure 





Table 9 shows the comparison for reasons to stay in the Navy of the Argus 
database for aviators of different years of service. 
 
Table 9.  Comparison of Argus Reasons to Stay in the Service Among Aviators 
(YOS 6-10) and All Aviators (YOS 10-20) 
 
Aviators     
YOS (6-10)   YOS (11-15) YOS (16-20)
  Reason to Stay 
     
1  Camaraderie 2 7
2  Current job satisfaction  3 1
3  Job interest  4 4
4  
Opportunity to work in primary 
rate/designator  19 3
5  Senior officer leadership quality  6 11
6  Level Responsibility  11 8
7  Level job challenge  12 25
8  Family support  1 5
9  Availability of detailer  16 .
10  PCS to jobs in good location  17 15
       SOURCE:  Argus Data, 16 December, 2002. 
 
 There are not as many noticeable differences between aviators of different years 
of service.  Previously mentioned was “camaraderie” as a motivating factor to remain in 
the service.  Junior officer aviators gave this their highest ranking for reasons to stay 
while it dropped to number two for aviators with YOS 11-15 and number seven for 
aviators with YOS 16-20.  This could be explained in that as you become more senior, 
there are fewer and fewer officers of your rank within your unit to socialize with. 
 Again, job satisfaction issues are five of the top-ten reasons junior officer aviators 
gave for remaining in the Navy.    The top reasons for staying in the Sullivan survey were 
“fulfillment/challenge” and “camaraderie/esprit de corps” (Sullivan, 1998).  These 
correspond with “current job satisfaction,” “job interest,” “level responsibility,” “level 




 Family support, while only number eight for junior officer aviators becomes the 
number one reason for aviators with YOS 11-16.   This could be because once officers 
are YOS 11-16, they are more likely to have older children and family concerns that 
younger officers may not. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
 Clearly, the Argus survey results show that as a group is broken down into 
smaller groups, the priority of reasons to remain in or leave the Navy can change by sub-
group.  Secondly, whether looking across the spectrum of junior officers, or of aviators of 
different years of service, there are differences in responses. 
 The largest difference can be seen between junior officer aviators YOS 6-10 and 
both groups of senior aviators, YOS 11-15 and YOS 16-20.  This shows that within the 
aviation community, there is a large degree of different factors for retention among the 
senior aviators who can make policy changes and the junior aviators that have the lowest 
retention. 
 Except for aviators’ “Repair parts needed” as a reason to leave, aviators were very 
similar to both URL officers and all officers.  More differences were noted between 
junior officer aviators and other junior officers.  A spouse’s career appeared not to be as 
important to non-aviation officers as it was to aviation officers.  While the reasons to 
leave the Navy “PCS moves effect on spouse career” and “Impact of location on spouse 
career” were both in the top-ten reasons for junior officer aviators, they were not nearly 
as high for junior officer non-aviators.  Similarly, “Repair parts needed” did not make the 
top ten lists for either of the junior officer non-aviators groups. 
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IV.  INTERVIEWS WITH NAVAL AVIATORS 
 
A. DATA COLLECTION 
The interviews were designed to give a cross sectional representation of the naval 
aviation community.  Due to the lack of sponsored travel funds, only select Naval Air 
Stations were used for gathering data.  To keep fleet coastal bias to a minimum, two 
bases in the Atlantic Fleet (N.A.S. Oceana and N.A.S. Norfolk) and one in the Pacific 
Fleet (N.A.S. Whidbey Island) were chosen.  To narrow the scope in studying retention 
factors, fixed wing aircraft were chosen as they have the lowest retention rates.  To have 
a good cross section of fixed wing aircraft and to remain within the three available Naval 
Air Stations, five fixed wing platforms were picked for interviews:  F-14 Tomcat, F/A-18 
Hornet, P-3C Orion, EA-6B Prowler, and E-2C Hawkeye.  
A key criterion established for this research was that interviews would be 
conducted in at least two different squadrons from each community to help eliminate any 
bias from within a single squadron. This was necessary, because in the case of the P-3C 
community, three squadrons are assigned to a Naval Air Station, but one squadron is 
always deployed, leaving only two squadrons accessible for interviews without traveling 
to another base.  Where possible, more than two squadrons per community were used for 
interviews.  A second criterion was that the people interviewed would have at a minimum 
of more than two years of operational experience in their first fleet sea tour.  This is 
important to insure that they have enough experience to assess reasons to stay in or get 
out of the Navy at the end of their MSR.  Some aviators past their MSR (LCDR) were 
also interviewed to get a different perspective from individuals who had more experience 
in the Navy, and in their own aviation community.  These Lieutenant Commanders were 
all on their second sea tour with YOS 10-13. 
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Due to time constraints on the part of the interviewer and operational 
commitments from the naval aviators interviewed, some groups were interviewed 
together as focus groups.  Through 21 interviews sessions, 42 total pilots were 
interviewed.  In 16 interviews or focus groups, 36 O-3 (Lieutenant) pilots were 
interviewed.  The six O-4 (Lieutenant Commander) pilots were queried in five 
interviews.  The pilots interviewed were selected because they were available in their 
squadrons at the time of interviews.  All pilots interviewed were male (unintentional).   
All of the pilots participated in either focus groups or interviews, and all interviews 
occurred in the first half of calendar year 2001.  These interviews were conducted after 
assuring the aviators that what they said would be totally confidential. 
The general format used for questions was: 
1. What is the number-one reason to think about leaving the Navy? 
2. What are other reasons to think about leaving? 
3. What is the number-one reason to consider staying in the Navy? 
4. What are other reasons to consider staying? 
5. If the number-one reason you gave to leave were resolved, would you be enticed to 
stay?  Why or why not? 
Those individuals past their MSR were asked the same basic questions but were 
also asked about the situation when they were making a decision to stay in or get out at 
their MSR.  Additionally, they were asked what they thought were the big issues facing 
the junior officers with whom they currently serve. 
All interviews were recorded on audio cassettes.  After completion of all the 
interviews, the audio cassettes were transcribed verbatim to facilitate further data 
analysis.  The findings are presented below first as results common to all communities, 
then data specific to each community are discussed. 
 
B. COMMON FINDINGS 
Fixed wing aviators for the five communities interviewed seem to have several 
retention factors that are common among them.  Not surprisingly, it is almost always a 
combination of factors that tend to make junior officers think about leaving the service.  
While most pilots could name factors affecting them either way, it was a combination of 
both good and bad things that was being weighed. 
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  The first and seemingly most predominant current factor for leaving the service 
seems to be the effect on the family.  Traditionally, the effect on the family was primarily 
the absence of the parent from the family.  Unlike 25 years ago, women today have many 
more opportunities open to them and many want a career outside the home.  Family 
separation and PCS moves in today’s Navy have a direct relationship to the spouse’s 
career opportunities.  It appears that more junior officers, who all have undergraduate 
education, are marrying women with higher levels of education also (Sullivan, 1998).  
Because of this education, a lot of these women want not just a job, but their own career.  
The old idea of being a “Navy Wife” just does not hold the appeal for today’s spouses.  
In sixteen of the twenty-one interviews, including all six of the O-4 interviews, the 
importance of a spouse’s career was addressed as a significant retention issue.  It is a 
common motif that aviators make a deal with their spouses that states the spouse will 
support the aviator while he is in the service, but that as soon as the aviator’s MSR is 
completed, the spouse wants the opportunity to have not just a job, but the chance to start 
a professional career.  EA-6B Prowler pilot LT A of VAQ-A states “She has her own 
career and we have made a lot of sacrifices.  She has made a lot of sacrifices for me to 
continue to do this, and I now I feel that it is time for me to sacrifice for her and go do 
something that includes her and gives her a chance for a career.”   
On the economic side, many aviators feel that in the long run, their family would 
be better off financially if both educated spouses had high paying careers, instead of the 
traditional male provider model.  Aviators believe their spouses feel that they can not 
necessarily start a career due to frequent duty location changes and to the sometimes lack 
of available career opportunities on or near remote naval air stations.  This information 
directly correlates with the information about spouse’s careers in the Argus database.  For 
junior officer aviators (YOS 6-10), the number-four reason to leave was the effect of PCS 
moves on the spouse’s career and the number-nine reason to leave was the impact of 
location on the spouse’s career.  This appears to be a new trend.  One of the EA-6B 
Prowler pilots, LT E attached to VAQ-C suggested that if the Navy does not want people 
to get out, “maybe they need to not let us get married.” 
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The other way that family separation appears to be different now as compared to 
the past is that these women are likely to be in the work force, they are reduced to 
working, single-parent status.  It is difficult to balance family and work with a spouse 
who is not available for childcare, transportation, etc.  During eight of the 16 interviews 
with Lieutenants, married aviators without children said this was a major concern for 
them so that they could start having children.  They want to be able to share the 
responsibility with their wives rather than leaving them as single, working parents.   
The factor of family separation also affects the single aviators.  Family separation 
to an unmarried aviator can mean time away from home, which translates to time away 
from the chance to start a relationship with the same type of educated and successful 
woman who is contributing to married aviators leaving the Navy.  Another factor is that 
the same frequent duty location changes and remote Naval Air Stations that can hinder 
spouses from careers, make it more difficult for unmarried aviators to pursue such 
relationships.  During six of the 16 O-3 interviews, single Lieutenants addressed this 
problem.  One F/A-18 pilot, LT K of VFA-E, said “the thing being is that we do not want 
to move to some s*** hole.”  LT H of VFA-D stated “the quality of life where the Navy 
chooses to place their operations at out of the way stations has a detrimental effect.”  One 
Lieutenant, from the VP-H focus group, when asked what factors would make him 
consider leaving,  said “I would say that areas that you can live in, like up here in XXXX 
for single guys, you can go out and have a good time only about two hours away.  It is 
that far to meet the kind of women I want to start something real with, or even just have a 
good time.”   
Another factor that is commonly discussed during interviews as a detractor for 
retention is the availability of parts and cannibalization.  Cannibalization is the taking of 
a part from one plane to use on another instead of using a new part, and usually involves 
only a single flight of the newly repaired plane.  The newly repaired plane then has the 
part again removed when it lands, and the part is placed back on the original plane.  With 
the exception of the four interviews with pilots in the F/A-18 Hornet community, which 
is the only community of the five interviewed that is still in production, all interviews 
revealed that a lack of parts is not only affecting material readiness but now also 
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personnel readiness in terms of retention.  LT N of VAW-I stated “you know parts will 
be an issue, parts always seem to be an issue.  It is just that I’m tired of walking out to a 
plane and it doesn’t work.  I’m tired of being in the situation where you’ve got three or 
four planes and only one plane works.”  During 13 interviews, pilots stated that they felt a 
lack of parts adds to the workload of both themselves and the enlisted who work under 
them.  This is called being asked to “do more with less” and is considered to be a “senior 
leadership problem” by many of the pilots and might explain the “trust in Navy 
leadership” and lack of “senior officer leadership” shown by the analysis of the Argus 
database in the top-ten reasons to leave the Navy for aviators (YOS 6-10).   
Aviators feel that cannibalization leads to squadrons having “Hanger Queens,” or 
aircraft that sit in the hangers because they have a part broken and the remaining parts 
that are good are then used to keep the other planes operational.  A pilot in the VP-G 
focus group stated: 
You shouldn’t have to rob parts off of other planes.  Now you’ve got two 
birds down to do one mission on one bird.  You come back and take those 
parts off and put them back on the other bird.  It just makes it a mask 
though.  It just makes the numbers work out so that everyone in the higher 
up thinks that this squadron is getting it done.  Meanwhile, we are flailing 
all over the place, swapping parts out here, swapping parts out there, you 
know? 
 
This is a lot of work both for the maintenance crews to constantly change parts 
out, and for the maintenance administration departments to document all the part 
relocations.  LT O of VF-L said: 
You’ve got to take it off one jet and put it into another, and the need to 
take it back off the one jet and put it back into the other, the man hours, 
it’s frustrating.  It’s like having only one battery for two different cars you 
own, switching the battery every time you want to drive it.  You need to 
work twice as hard to keep your head above water. 
   
Aviators feel that pre-flights can be forced to go a lot longer, causing mission-
critical takeoff times to be missed.  They also feel that the redundant and extra work by 
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their enlisted leads to retention and motivation problems among the troops.  Analysis of 
the Argus database showed the availability of supplies as the number-one reason for 
junior officer aviators with YOS 6-10 to think of leaving the Navy.  Need for repair parts 
was the number-five reason the leave the Navy. 
With respect for the positive factors for retention, there seem to be some common 
reasons that make junior aviators consider staying in the Navy.  The first of these is the 
obvious, the flying.  In every interview through every community, the aviators stated that 
they liked what they did.  The chance to fly military aircraft and use military hardware 
was cited as a prime motivator to join the Navy. They said that even when there were a 
lot of other collateral duties to perform, the flying is what keeps them motivated.  In 
seven of the 21 interviews, pilots stated that even though they might have the opportunity 
to leave the Navy and fly for a civilian airline, the flying would not be the same.  They 
felt that airline flying was a way to lessen the negative factors they found in the Navy, 
such as time away from home, little-to-no choice in locations to live, and family burden.  
The change in pay was only cited as a minor form of compensation.   
These findings were consistent with the Argus data.  Argus shows the amount of 
pay received was not in the top-thirty reasons to leave the service, but was actually the 
number-thirteen reason to stay in the Navy.  These aviators even referred to being an 
airline pilot as being a “bus driver.”  They felt that military flying, and the dynamics of 
the military flight environment, were much more interesting and fun, and thus increased 
their desire to remain in the service.  These findings were consistent with the Argus data.  
Job satisfaction, job interest, the opportunity to work in their primary designator (1310), 
the level of job responsibility, and the level of challenge of their job, made up five of the 
top-ten reasons junior officer aviators gave Argus as reasons to remain in the Navy. 
The second factor that positively, across the spectrum of communities, affects the 
junior aviator’s decisions about remaining in the Navy is the idea of having a great 
wardroom environment.  The camaraderie of the wardroom was discussed in all 21 
interviews.  Most aviators interviewed felt that the people they dealt with on a day-to-day 
basis were of a better and more trustworthy caliber than people they could have the 
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opportunity to work with out of the Navy.  F-14 pilot LT Q of VF-M said “You can’t find 
a higher class, quality group of people that have fun together and work together, and all 
that!”  The close operations, where their lives depend on each other, are cited as the 
reasons for a close bonding within the wardroom environment.  LT N of VAW-I said “the 
J.O.s [junior officers], we’ve got a really good camaraderie.  So that is definitely one 
thing I like.”  Although interviews showed that military flying was the most important 
factor for staying in the Navy, camaraderie is actually the number-one reason to remain 
in the Navy for junior officer aviators (YOS 6-10) in the Argus database. 
One last important factor to discuss is the fact that anonymity was very important.  
Before the interviews commenced, the officers being interviewed were told that the data 
would be completely anonymous.  A lot of them wanted to be completely sure that 
anything they said could not later be used against them or tied directly to them.  When 
asked why, they said that they did not want it to be traced back to them for fear of 
repercussions such as lower fitness reports.  Even in the case of those planning on leaving 
the Navy; they did not want their responses to affect their chances of getting into the 
reserves if they later decided to do so.  When asked about surveys, they reported that, 
again, they were very skeptical of reporting things that they thought could be linked to 
them and later possibly used against them.   
While the general analysis of reasons to leave and reasons to stay are similar to 
the Argus database results, there seemed to be a very dominant, specific reason to leave 
for each individual platform sub-community.  These reasons would be impossible to 
retrieve from the Argus database due to the lack of discrimination among platforms as 
well as the small number of responses when looking at the junior officer aviators in the 
various platform sub-communities.  These reasons do become apparent in interviews, 
however. 
 
C. EA-6B PROWLER 
Six pilots from three different squadrons in the EA-6B community, stationed at 
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, participated in five interviews.  Four of the pilots were 
O-3s and two were O-4s.  In the first EA-6B squadron (VAQ-A), LT A and LT B were 
 47
interviewed together while LCDR C was interviewed alone.  In the second squadron 
(VAQ-B), LCDR D and LT E were both interviewed individually.  In the third squadron 
(VAQ-C), four O-3s were interviewed as a focus group.   
Throughout all five of the Prowler interviews, one factor became apparent as a 
major reason for an EA-6B Prowler pilot to leave the service: the large amount of time 
away from home.  LT A of VAQ-A stated, “I mean we can be gone from home seven to 
ten months a year.  I have been gone close to three-hundred days before…  Not in a row, 
a Fallon det [detachment] here, an exercise there, workups, CQs [carrier landing 
qualifications], deployment, it all adds up to nights not spent at home in my own bed.”    
With the Air Force EF-111 being taken out of service, the Navy EA-6B squadrons have 
been forced not only to perform their Navy role but also to work with the Air Force.  This 
has led to more Air Force exercises and therefore more time away from home.  It was 
expressed in all five EA-6B Prowler interviews that even though deployment lengths are 
similar to other platforms in the Navy, the pilots felt that the time spent away from home 
while not on deployment was much greater than other aviation platforms.  This means 
that they felt they had less time actually at home compared to other naval aviators.  
LCDR D of VAQ-B said “there is a very community-specific thing about always being 
gone.”  
Time away from home is seen as detractor from marriage and parenting as well a 
chance for single pilots to start and sustain relationships.  LT E of VAQ-B stated that on a 
tour of “three years I was gone for almost two years.  I promised my wife I would never 
put her through that again.”      
Another factor involved with time away from home is the lack of lead time for 
planning to be away from home.  While deployments are fairly well planned out ahead of 
time, during the pre-deployment training time these other duties pop up and require pilots 
to be away from home on short notice.  This makes it hard to plan for the absence.  
LCDR B of VAQ-A said the Navy should “try to put some stability in our warm-up 
cycle.  Okay, you’re going to be gone X number of days this year, but I can tell you what 
those days are going to be.”    
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If extensive time away from home could be fixed, three of the four O-3 pilots and 
both of the O-4 pilots say it would be a lot easier to remain in the Navy.  One of the four 
Lieutenants in VAQ-C said “I understand that much time [time that is required], you have 
to spend away [from home], when you are on workup cycles out there.  If there were a 
way to reduce that though, whether it was reduced deployment time [or something 
else]… I think it would make things a lot easier.” 
 
D. F/A-18 HORNET 
 Seven pilots from three different squadrons in the F/A-18 community, stationed 
at Naval Air Station Oceana, participated in four interviews.  Five of the pilots were O-3s 
and two were O-4s.  In the first F/A-18 squadron (VFA-D), LCDR F and LCDR G were 
interviewed together and LT H and LT I were interviewed together.  In the second 
squadron (VFA-E), LT J and LT K were both interviewed together.  In the third squadron 
(VFA-F), LT L was interviewed alone.  Workload was a key theme that emerged from 
these interviews. 
“The thing that frustrates me the most is how much we as a squadron as a whole, 
how much we are taxed with the amount of work they expect out of this squadron.  It is 
unbelievable.  It is unreal.”  This was the sentiment of LT H of VFA-D.  All of the 
squadrons interviewed as well as the majority of Navy F/A-18 Hornet squadrons are 
composed of single-seat fighter aircraft.  This means that they have no NFOs and have 
less officer manning compared to other squadrons.  In all four interviews, all seven F/A-
18 pilots said that the biggest retention problem for F/A-18 pilots is the amount of time 
spent at work, especially compared to other platforms.  For example, the F-14 squadrons 
have roughly twice the number of officers.  LT L of VFA-F asked “When you look at our 
tomcat brothers, then you sort of get a feel that they get a lot more free time than we do, 
why is that?  Is it because there’s twice as many of them to do a lot more of the same 
kind of job?”  While other squadrons appear to have more officers to do the same number 
of tasks, the F/A-18 squadrons have to accomplish the same work with sometimes a 
quarter of the number of people in other squadrons.  LCDR G of VFA-D stated: 
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While we still had the same number of programs, it was impossible for all 
the reports to be completed, so it took a JO [junior officer] in the 
squadron, he had his primary duties and probably three or four collateral 
duties.  We didn’t have any branch officers or anything like that so he was 
doing all those duties.  
  
As a LT K of VFA-F put it, “The biggest detractor I would say is the amount of workload 
in this community.” 
In all four of the Hornet interviews the F/A-18 pilots brought up the problem of 
being overworked.  LT I of VFA-D said: 
I think that maybe we are over tasked sometimes.  We’re being spread too 
thin and that translates to even when you are at home and holding down a 
couple of other jobs (collateral duties).  This is our slow time, technically.  
You can ask my wife, I leave every morning about 6:45 AM and I haven’t 
been home yet until 6:00 or 6:30 PM and this is, you know, you’re talking 
close to 12-hour days, and this is our slow time.  It is disgusting the 
number of hours we put in. 
 
LT H of VFA-D was extremely upset and stated “that’s what I consider bull**** 
hours and makes me want to get out.”  LCDR F of VFA-D said:  
You have two department heads in the squadron and guess what?  
Guaranteed you’re probably going to have the same operational staff and 
doing the same stuff.  You’re just going to be working 18-hour days or 
probably doing 14-hour days.  So guys look at that and go, what’s the 
attraction in that? 
 
 50
Shore duty appears no longer to have the meaning of fewer working hours 
compared to sea tours, and pilots would like to see this change.  LCDR F of VFA-D 
stated “What adds to that workload is the process we are seeing right now with shore duty 
continuing to get shorter and shorter for guys in our community and the rotation and 
opportunities we are being presented are being decreased based on manning.”  Junior 
officer pilots like LT L of VFA-F say things like “I want to enjoy my shore tour and not 
have to work the same kind of hours I worked [on sea duty].”  Pilot LCDR G of VFA-D 
reported:  
As an instructor, we worked six days a week, a full day or a half a day on 
Sunday, everyday, every week.  There was never a day we could take off.  
There were many months that I never had a day off.  There were 14 days 
that we were scheduled for three flights a day.  I mean that is not shore 
duty in the sense that we knew or thought it was going to be. 
 
Under manning of the squadrons appears to be a contributing factor to the intense 
workload felt by the pilots.  LCDR F of VFA-D reported that after a deployment, when 
pilots started transferring out of the squadron, they weren’t getting the new pilots in so 
that “we got all the way down for a couple of months, down to 12 pilots.  All those 
administrative burdens are still there.”  Because of this lack of manpower, immediately 
after deployment instead of having a lot of down time, LT L of VFA-F reported “you go 
right back to work, where you are putting in 12 hours a day already.  You say ‘What the 
hell am I doing?  We just got back!’”  This manpower shortage then feeds attrition.  The 
low manpower makes it more difficult to accomplish things like maintenance inspections.   
Pilot LCDR G of VFA-D said “It has taken us a month to a month to a month and a half 
to get ready for this thing, and it affects everyone because you’ve got the troops down 
there working, you know weekends, 14- to 16-hour days to get ready for this inspection.” 
 LT I of VFA-D thinks “the entire workload is more.  Yeah, absolutely, because 
we do a lot more missions and we have less guys with the changing times.”  As retention 
continues to remain low, the workload does not seem to get any better.  LCDR F of VFA-
D stated that “overall workload; that has a negative impact on family life and quality of 
life.”   When asked how to fix this problem LT K of VFA-F had a suggestion. “Okay, 
maybe it is time we need to start compressing squadrons and make, instead of two, 12-
plane squadrons, have one, 8-plane squadron or something like that because that’s about 
all we have the manning for.”  Most pilots said that they loved flying the F/A-18 and if 
there were a way to reduce the amount of work and time, that they would find it a lot 
easier to consider remaining in the Navy. 
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E. P-3C ORION 
Nine pilots from two different squadrons in the P-3C community, stationed at 
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, participated in three interviews.  In one squadron (VP-
G), five of the pilots were a member of the first focus group, in the second squadron (VP-
H), three O-3s were in the second P-3C focus group, and one O-4, LCDR M, was 
interviewed.  In both the focus groups of O-3s and the interview with the O-4, it was 
stated that the P-3C Orion pilots’ biggest concern is their career pipeline.  One Lieutenant 
in the VP-G focus group said, “In our squadron this is probably the biggest issue.  I don’t 
want to go to the boat.  I would like to be in command some day, if there is a reward, but 
not the boat.”  The normal career pipeline for a P-3 pilot is the first sea duty tour, shore 
duty, a disassociated sea tour (on an aircraft carrier not in a flying billet), and then back 
to a sea tour as a department head.  The problem with the pipeline is associated with the 
most important reason people gave for remaining in the Navy, the flying.  
The first effect that the pipeline has on the ability to fly is that the disassociated 
sea tour on an aircraft carrier is not a flying billet.  This represents working away from 
the primary job of being a pilot and getting to fly.  The Argus database showed that for 
junior officers, the majority of reasons to stay in the Navy focused around flying and their 
primary jobs as pilots.  Most of these pilots feel they will be away from home for a long 
time without the compensation of flying.  A Lieutenant in the VP-G focus group said 
“you don’t want to go to the boat because you are gone ten months.  You are told only 
one six-month deployment but the truth is that you are gone ten months out of the year.”  
The pilots would like to be able to get other orders that involve flying.  A Lieutenant in 
the VP-H focus group reported “that’s not what I want to do.  If I wanted to go on the 
boat, that’s fine, but if I don’t want to go there I shouldn’t have to.”   
The other factor that discourages P-3 pilots is that if they accept orders to the 
aircraft carrier, they will lose their airplane pilot currency, which is needed for an airline 
job.  Most pilots feel that they would then be trapped into going back for their department 
head sea tour in order to regain their currency and again become competitive for an 
airline job if they so desire.  One pilot, a Lieutenant in VP-H, stated, “they’ve got you by 
the **** because you’ve lost your currency.”  For most pilots then, if they feel that they 
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want to leave the Navy, the time after their shore duty, which for the most part coincides 
with the end of the MSR, becomes the best time to leave for an airline job.  Another 
Lieutenant in VP-G noted “that’s why we lose everybody at that point, they don’t want to 
go to the boat, I do not want to go to the boat.” 
The last issue with “going to the boat” is that junior officer P-3 pilots do not see 
the reward after completing the carrier tour.  A member of the VP-G focus group stated 
“there are issues like the kind of job we see the O-4s have.”  If the motivation is being 
able to fly, the junior officer pilots feel that O-4s do not fly enough and do too much 
paperwork.  One aviator in the VP-G group said “you are not coming back as a Junior 
Officer, you are not upgrading.  You are going to be an O-4 pushing paperwork.”  
Another pilot in the VP-H group stated “all you are going to do is come back as an O-4…    
It is probably just more paperwork and no chance to fly.  That’s the way I see it.”  
Because of this, a lot of the pilots feel that if you want get out, the best time to do it is 
upon the end of their MSR. 
The best suggestion to improve retention was to develop an alternate career path 
that allows P-3 pilots to remain in the cockpit flying.  The aviators said that if that was an 
option they would be much more likely to remain in the Navy.  LCDR M of VP-H stated 
“you keep pilots in if they are flying.” 
 
F. E-2C HAWKEYE 
Seven pilots from three different squadrons in the E-2C community, stationed at 
Naval Air Station Norfolk, participated in three interviews.  In the first squadron (VAW-
I) a single pilot, LT N, was interviewed.  In the second squadron (VAW-J), three O-3 
pilots were a member of the first E-2C focus group.  In a third squadron (VAW-K), three 
O-3s were interviewed in a second E-2C focus group.  A pilot, a Lieutenant in VAW-J, 
sums up the E-2 community retention problem.  He says: 
It is an off-tempo issue, especially in the E-2 community.  We do work 
ups, we deploy, then when we come back, instead of getting time off we 
go do counter-narcotic operations.  The only thing unique to the E-2 
community is that you come home for a month off a cruise, now you’re 
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rolling for 59 [days], because 60 days was considered a deployment.  So 
they take you for 59 days down to the Caribbean doing counter-narcotics 
operations.  So you’ve said hi to your wife and kids and then for another 
month you say goodbye to them and when you get back you’re right back 
into workup cycle again. 
 
All seven of the E-2 pilots interviewed brought this up as a community problem.  
With the need for assets in the War-on-Drugs, E-2 pilots report coming home from a six-
month deployment, having about a month of home time, and then packing their bags for a 
59-day deployment, before returning home and having only a short time before beginning 
workups for the next deployment.  Another Lieutenant in VAW-J stated “you’ve got 
three flights a day, but when are you going to get a day off in the 59 days?  Not likely.”  
What really seems to upset the pilots about this situation is that 59 days is one day short 
of qualifying for an official deployment.  LT N of VAW-I noted: 
The thing about the whole 59-day cycle is I remember having a broken 
airplane down there and nobody was concerned that you had been down 
there for 59 days, people were only concerned that you might not make it 
back before 60.  People were interested because that would make their 
piece of paper now say ‘he got deployed.’  It’s having to prevent that 
happening that is important.  You can be there 59 days and nobody cares, 
but one more day, their world blows up and they care but before that they 
couldn’t care less. 
   
A pilot in the VAW-K focus group said “all I mean, it just is obvious to 
everybody else that they’re playing the rule book so that we can just screw them to the 
maximum that the law will allow.”   
When asked if changing this would make a difference, the E-2 pilots interviewed 
said it would seem that they would have a more equitable arrangement making it easier to 
stay.  They just want to have some more time at home.  A pilot in the VAW-K focus 
group stated that not only did they have “a few periods of workups, a six-month cruise, 
get back from that, get a month off, and then we were off down to Puerto Rico for a 
month to eight weeks doing counter narcotics and it hardly seems like we caught our 
breath before starting it all again.”  The suggestion was to eliminate the extra anti-
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narcotics detachments.  It was suggested that this problem could be overcome by giving a 
squadron a deployment to Puerto Rico to fulfill the requirements instead of taking post-
cruise squadrons. 
 
G. F-14 TOMCAT 
Ten pilots from three different squadrons in the F-14 community, stationed at 
Naval Air Station Oceana, participated in six interviews.  Nine of the pilots were O-3s 
and one was an O-4.  In the first F-14 squadron (VF-L), a three O-3 focus group as well 
as an individual, LT O, were interviewed.  In the second squadron (VF-M), LT P was 
interviewed individually while LT Q and LT R were both interviewed together.  In the 
third squadron (VF-N), LT S and LT T were interviewed together while LCDR V was 
interviewed individually.   
The F-14 Tomcat is unique among the other platforms in that the aircraft is 
scheduled to be phased out of operation over the next several years.  Of the nine O-3 
pilots, all shared a major concern by about transitioning out of the F-14 and getting lost 
out of the community in the process.  LT P of VF-M said: 
They all know their platform is going away and now they are transitioning 
over so that kind of changes things.  They know they are not coming back 
to the same community.  If they come back, they might not have a job.  
They might get put somewhere else because they are not actually already 
trained for the new platform.  So if they leave their squadron flying F-14s, 
go do some shore duty out of the platform, and then think they have a 
squadron to come back to, they might not necessarily get put into a new 
Hornet squadron, so then where are they?  So that whole uncertainty for 
them is a big issue in the community.  
 
Not knowing with certainty that they will wind up back in the cockpit of a tactical 
jet fighter makes a lot the Lieutenants apprehensive about remaining in the Navy.  LT O 
of VF-L states: 
Looking at our community, particularly the way we are headed right now, 
you know, starting to disestablish squadrons and transition to the Super-
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Hornet, you know it kind of gives everyone an iffy sense of the future, 
especially for the pilot. 
   
Another F-14 pilot, LT P of VF-M said: 
The problem is that they (the Navy) go buy Super-Hornets, but there 
aren’t enough of them yet.  There will be a great deal of anticipation about 
filling orders because we know Tomcats are going away and it is going to 
be hard to come back.  
  
LT T of VF-N said: 
They are really worried because there are not going to be as many Hornets 
to come back to.  So then there a lot of extra pilots and what to do with 
them?  Where do they go?  To ground jobs?  That seems to be a concern 
for a lot of the guys. 
 
To fix this problem, most of the pilots said that they wanted some kind of 
assurance as to where they would be going and what they would be flying if they 
remained in the Navy.  They said that if they had a guarantee of remaining in the cockpit 
of a Super-Hornet, it would be a much easier decision to remain in the Navy. 
 
H. SUMMARY 
In conclusion, the interviews found similar results as those found using Argus for 
the aviation community as a whole.  However, within specific platforms, retention factors 
that are not identified by Argus became noticeable through interviews.  Analysis of the 
Argus data showed flying and job satisfaction as well as camaraderie as being prime 
reasons to remain in the Navy for junior officer pilots.  The interview information 
supports these data.  Similarly, Argus showed that for a junior aviator, a spouse’s career 
played an important role in the decision to leave the Navy and this factor was also 
confirmed by the interviews.  Further, items such as parts and supply problems were 
brought up over and over again throughout the interviews just as Argus shows. 
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The problem with Argus is that a further breakdown of aviators into platform 
communities is not available.  The interviews showed that while Argus is accurate for 
across-the-board reasons for aviators to leave, the biggest problems seem to be at the 
community level.  The basic problems noted through the interviews are: 
1. EA-6B Prowler:  These aviators feel they are away from home for longer 
periods of time than pilots in other Navy squadrons. 
2. F/A-18 Hornet:  With fewer officers in F/A-18 squadrons than in other 
squadrons, the amount of non-flying work required by the pilots is perceived 
to be too time intensive. 
3. P-3C Orion:  The normal career paths of these pilots force them to take a 
disassociated non-flying tour, which takes them away from piloting, their 
primary reason to remain in the Navy.  
4. E-2C Hawkeye:  A 59-day, counter-drugs detachment, one day short of being 
counted as a deployment, is required of pilots after returning from 
deployments.  As a result, the pilots have less time at home. 
5. F-14 Tomcat:  The community is being phased out of operation causing a lot 
of uncertainty regarding opportunities to fly tactical jets in the Navy. 
These community problems cannot be seen in the Argus database because the 









































V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. SUMMARY 
This study will enhance the ability of the Navy to examine the problem of fixed 
wing aviator retention.  First, historical retention information was examined.  Second, the 
Argus Career Milestone Tracking system was explained and the Argus retention data 
collected were analyzed.  Lastly, information from interviews with naval pilots was 
examined and compared with the information from Argus.   
Historical retention information showed that junior aviator CCRs (Cumulative 
Continuation Rates) vary by platform, both historically and recently.  Fixed wing aviators 
continue to have lower retention than rotary wing (helicopter) pilots and NFOs.  This 
variation by platform has existed under both the previous selective bonus plan and under 
the current ACCP bonus plan open to all aviators. 
To study the factors affecting retention, the Argus Career Milestone Tracking 
system was developed and has been online and operational since February 2001.  Argus 
is a branching web-based survey designed to gather information on Navy personnel.  This 
information is then used to propose program/policy changes.  Argus generates two lists 
by frequency of responses to the web-based survey.  The first list is the top 30 most 
important factors for the individuals in the queried group to consider staying in the Navy, 
the second list is the top 30 most important factors influencing their decisions to leave the 
Navy.   
Argus shows that for all aviators as a group, flying and job satisfaction as well as 
the camaraderie of their wardrooms are the prime reasons for staying in the Navy.  
Factors such as a lack of supplies and parts are noted in the Argus data as major reasons 
to leave the Navy at the end of an aviator’s initial commitment.   Similarly, the Argus 
data show that a spouse’s career plays an important part in the decision to leave the Navy 
for junior officer aviators.  
Through 21 interviews sessions, 42 total pilots were interviewed.  These pilots 
were from five fixed wing aircraft communities, two propeller (P-3C and E-2C) and three 
jet (F/A-18, F-14, and EA-6B).  These squadrons were chosen from two bases in the 
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Atlantic Fleet (N.A.S. Oceana and N.A.S. Norfolk) and one in the Pacific Fleet (N.A.S. 
Whidbey Island), in order to minimize fleet coastal bias.  In order to analyze the factors 
affecting junior officer aviators at the end of their initial commitment, the group of pilots 
consisted of 36 O-3 (Lieutenant) pilots that were all in their first sea tours with at least 
two years of fleet experience and six O-4 (Lieutenant Commander) pilots on their second 
sea tour. 
The pilots were asked questions about their reasons for wanting to leave or stay in 
the Navy at the end of their initial commitments.  The interviews confirmed the Argus 
analysis, that flying and job satisfaction issues, as well the camaraderie of the wardroom, 
are the primary reasons for junior officer aviators to remain in the Navy.  Lack of parts 
and supplies leading to “cannibalization” were found through the interviews to be leading 
factors in an aviator’s decision to leave the Navy.  The lack of parts and supplies were 
also found to be factors toward leaving the service in analysis of the Argus data.  Further, 
the interviews showed that, similar to the Argus data, the career of an aviator’s spouse 
plays an important role in the decision to leave the Navy. 
However, just as CCR rates show that as data get broken down into smaller sub-
communities: propellers, jets, and helicopters, and then into specific platforms (F-14, 
F/A-18, P-3C, etc.), retention can differ, the interviews found the reasons to stay or leave 
the Navy can also differ.  Through the interviews, important factors unique to each 
platform were found.  These factors are major differences among the platforms that 
Argus is currently not able to show because it does not collect data by platform.  The 
basic problems noted by each community through the interviews are: 
1. EA-6B Prowler:  These aviators feel they are away from home for longer 
periods of time than pilots in other Navy squadrons. 
2. F/A-18 Hornet:  With fewer officers in F/A-18 squadrons than in other 
squadrons, the amount of non-flying work required by the pilots is perceived 
to be too time intensive. 
3. P-3C Orion:  The normal career paths of these pilots force them to take a 
disassociated non-flying tour, which takes them away from piloting, their 
primary reason to remain in the Navy.  
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4. E-2C Hawkeye:  A 59-day, counter-drugs detachment, one day short of being 
counted as a deployment, is required of pilots after returning from 
deployments.  As a result, the pilots have less time at home. 
5. F-14 Tomcat:  The community is being phased out of operation causing a lot 
of uncertainty regarding opportunities to fly tactical jets in the Navy. 
 
B. OBSERVATIONS ON THE ARGUS SYSTEM 
The Argus survey currently collects most of the data that are useful for analysis of 
aviator retention.  However, one important item, specific platform, is missing.  Retention 
rates by platform differ, and information broken down by platform would enable 
researchers to explore these differences.  Policy changes undertaken to improve retention 
are most likely to be effective if they are platform specific.  
Rather than collecting data on specific platforms, Argus asks respondents to 
classify themselves by aviation community as Fixed Wing Fighter, Fixed Wing Other, 
Rotary, or Other.  As noted above, disaggregation by platform is preferable.  However 
there is a further problem.  A lack of definitions of these communities can mislead 
respondents to misclassify themselves.  By one interpretation, only the F-14 and F/A-18 
sub-communities fall under the Fixed Wing Fighter branch of Aviation, and all other 
fixed wing aviators would fall under Fixed Wing Other.  This category would include 
both carrier based tactical jets (EA-6B, S-3), carrier based props (E-2C, C-2), land based 
jets (E-6A) and land based props (P-3C, and EP-3).  But it is also possible that both S-3 
and EA-6B pilots, who are tactical carrier jet aviators, could select Fixed Wing Fighter as 
their category.  Further, the selection Other is not defined, but the first three choices, 
Fixed Wing Fighter, Fixed Wing Other, and Rotary should encompass all current Navy 
platforms, making the choice Other unnecessary.   
Much of the data collected with the Argus questionnaire is not accessible.  
Particularly, researchers are limited to the ordinal rankings of responses by frequency 
without the actual frequencies of each response, limiting the number of interesting 
research questions that can be addressed.  For example, we do not know whether one 
complaint is almost universally voiced compared with other reasons given for leaving the 
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Navy, or whether the top ten reasons are expressed with roughly equal frequency.  The 
lack of such information leaves little basis for policy focus.  
Argus has been online and operational since February 2001.  OPNAV Instruction 
1040.10 (May 2001) only makes the Argus survey optional.  While there are well over 
7,000 aviators currently in the Navy, from February 2001 to December 2002, only 490 
aviators responded to the Argus survey.   
There are two problems with this small number of responses.  First, the sample 
group may be biased.  Perhaps only disgruntled aviators voluntarily take the time to 
complete the Argus questionnaire.  Only if a random sample were to complete the survey, 
instead of a self-selected voluntary sample, can the lack of bias be assured.  The second 
problem is that with so few aviators in the database, smaller sub-communities with 
retention problems cannot be analyzed.  By not having a larger population of Argus 
respondents, even if individual platform information were available, there are so few 
observations that the sample sizes for the smaller groups would be too small for such 
disaggregation to be meaningful. 
 
C.       CONCLUSIONS 
In general, the Argus Career Milestone Tracking System appears to be an accurate 
model for a large group, such as all aviators, or all junior officer aviators.  The interviews 
corroborate Argus for aviators as a group. 
Because Argus can not analyze pilots by platform, it is difficult to see if any 
common retention factors play a role at the platform level.  The interview data showed 
that there are dramatic differences in retention factors among pilots of different 
platforms.  These differences need to be addressed individually in order analyze how they 
affect junior officer naval aviator retention. 
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 D.       RECOMMENDATIONS  
This thesis makes these specific recommendations regarding the Argus Career 
Milestone Tracking System: 
1. The Navy should change OPNAV Instruction 1040.10 (May 2001) to make 
mandatory the completion of the Argus questionnaire at all the career milestones 
listed in OPNAV Instruction 1040.10 paragraph 4, with the exception of involuntary 
separation from the naval service, which can continue to remain optional.  Argus 
already prints a receipt of completion at the end of the survey.  This should be used as 
a check off at the Personnel Support Division before transferring the paperwork 
needed for promotions, permanent changes of duty station, etc.  This will increase the 
availability and usefulness of Argus data for analysis of personnel retention policies. 
2. Because privacy of information is such a concern to people giving retention 
information, the Navy should create a very specific policy addressing security and 
privacy concerns.  This new policy should be specifically stated at the beginning of 
the Argus survey.  The Navy should establish and publicize repercussions for anyone 
divulging or using Argus retention information linked to individuals.  If the data 
collected are to be useful, individual responses cannot ever be shared with the chain 
of command.  These steps should help to keep individuals from only putting neutral 
answers to avoid possible career repercussions. 
3. Argus should collect specific aviation platform information.  This information would 
allow researchers to analyze the effect that factors affecting specific platform 
communities have on aviator retention. 
4. The raw data from the Argus Career Milestone and Tracking System should be made 
available to outside sources for further research.  First, by not allowing the raw data 
to be examined by outside sources, further analysis is limited, especially because the 
output is only the ordinal ranking of the frequency of the responses without the actual 
number of responses for each retention factor selected.  Second, raw data would 
enable a researcher to partition the data as desired.  For example, sub-communities 
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such as propeller, jet, and helicopter, as well as carrier aircraft and land based aircraft, 
could be defined by groups of platforms, the data partitioned by platform, and 
examined. 
5. If the Navy chooses not to release raw Argus survey data to researchers and not to 
collect platform data, then at a minimum the Argus formatting for the branching 
under the Aviation community should be restructured in order to perform more 
detailed analysis of the data.  There are two possible ways to perform this: 
a. Under the Aviation community, there could be just three branches, Propeller, 
Jet, and Helicopter. 
b. Under the Aviation community, there could be the four branches of Fixed 
Wing Carrier Based, Fixed Wing Land Based, Operational Helicopter, and 
Training Command.  This would allow for carrier aviation to be examined 
separately. 
6. If the Navy chooses not to release raw Argus Data and not to restructure the 
formatting under the Aviation branch, then the current platforms should be more 
precisely defined.  The current choices of Fixed Wing Fighter, Fixed Wing Other, 
Rotary, and Other have no clear definitions.  The lack of definitions can lead to 
respondents misclassifying themselves. 
7. Future research should focus on the factors found to affect aviator retention.  This 
research should examine possible solutions for the factors reported to have the largest 
negative impact on retention in each platform.  These possible solutions will then 
need to be examined for both feasibility of implementation and financial cost, and 
then compared to the financial cost of proposed bonus programs. 
For example, in the P-3C community, pilots are dissatisfied with their career path 
because it takes them out of the cockpit for a disassociated sea tour.  Currently all P-
3C pilots must complete a disassociated sea tour in order to screen for command.  The 
current career path forces them to pursue command.  One possible solution is to have 
an alternate career path that does not require pilots to have a disassociated sea tour.  
Pilots rejecting the disassociated sea tour could be told up front that they could not 
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get promoted past Lieutenant Commander, but that they could continue flying.  While 
this would limit the number of people eligible for promotion and therefore command, 
it would allow for a larger number of department heads at the YOS 10-12 mark, 
where the retention gap is the largest.  Were this policy considered, the cost of losing 
the manpower on the aircraft carriers (the disassociated sea tour) also would have to 
be examined.  From which alternate sources could the missing manpower be 
extracted?  How much financial cost would the Navy have to endure to replace the 
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APPENDIX A.  PILOT, NFO, AND PLATFORM AVIATION SUB-
COMMUNITIES 
 
Cumulative Continuation Rates (CCRs) measure the propensity of an aviator in 
their seventh year of service to remain on active duty at the end of their twelfth year of 
service, which roughly corresponds to the end of their department head tour.  Appendix 
A, Table A.1 shows the Cumulative Continuation Rates for all aviators from fiscal year 
1985 through fiscal year 2000.  These data are unpublished and were obtained from the 
Aviation Community Manager’s Office.  The data are in percentage form and therefore 
raw analysis of numbers for weighting purposes cannot be determined.   
It is important to note that in 1989, changes to legislation resulted in an increase 
in the minimum obligated service, commitment incurred after completing aviation 
training and receiving wings, for aviators to increase to six years for NFOs, seven years 
for propeller and helicopter pilots, and eight years for jet pilots.  Because of this, seven 
years later, in 1996, there appears to be an increase in the CCR.  This increase is 
artificially driven by the increase in minimum obligated service (McKenzie, 1999).   
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Table A.1.  Aviation Cumulative Continuation Rates (CCR) for FY 1986-2000 
part 1 
 
FISCAL YEAR 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
ALL AVIATORS 41% 40% 44% 43% 42% 44% 40% 37% 39% 
ALL PILOTS 32% 32% 35% 34% 38% 41% 33% 33% 42% 
JET PILOTS 29% 33% 36% 27% 35% 34% 36% 31% 52% 
PROP PILOTS 22% 20% 19% 25% 26% 29% 23% 21% 29% 
HELO PILOTS 60% 48% 55% 53% 52% 56% 51% 46% 44% 
          
          
ALL NFOS 58% 57% 61% 60% 49% 49% 54% 45% 34% 
JET NFOS 56% 57% 59% 61% 45% 47% 56% 47% 37% 
PROP NFOS 61% 57% 62% 60% 50% 52% 48% 42% 30% 
          
PILOT          
VFA (F/A-18) 33% 40% 42% 33% 30% 29% 42% 35% 49% 
VF (F-14) 35% 31% 36% 25% 33% 30% 25% 22% 62% 
VS (S-3) 20% 38% 31% 19% 25% 20% 15% 21% 22% 
VAW (E-2C) 20% 21% 15% 19% 26% 14% 17% 43% 75% 
VQ JET (ES-3) 21% 10% 33% 15% 100% 17% 50% 100% 100%
VAQ (EA-6B) 19% 22% 57% 19% 36% 12% 60% 45% 56% 
VP (P-3) 22% 20% 18% 27% 28% 25% 28% 22% 24% 
VQ PROP (EP-3) 33% 9% 11% 65% 52% 15% 18% 30% 56% 
VQ TAC (E-6A) 37% 25% 14% 18% 14% 24% 5% 12% 10% 
HS (H-3, H-60) 53% 58% 67% 49% 52% 61% 50% 49% 30% 
HM (H-53) 82% 42% 41% 45% 62% 59% 36% 30% 59% 
HSL (H-2, H-60) 56% 40% 45% 59% 54% 47% 59% 46% 51% 
HC (H-46, H-3, H-
53) 56% 40% 45% 53% 49% 49% 43% 49% 50% 
          
NFO          
VF (F-14) 60% 57% 52% 50% 46% 42% 62% 51% 47% 
VS (S-3) 58% 61% 47% 63% 40% 36% 52% 30% 29% 
VP (P-3) 60% 52% 61% 61% 47% 53% 45% 44% 23% 
VAQ (EA-6B) 53% 76% 61% 75% 52% 43% 58% 60% 29% 
VAW (E-2C) 53% 76% 61% 60% 56% 41% 49% 41% 46% 
VQ PROP (EP-3) 61% 73% 71% 47% 58% 46% 53% 47% 46% 
VQ JET (ES-3) 86% 67% 67% 49% 41% 57% 41% 69% 40% 
VQ TAC (E-6A) 63% 61% 74% 59% 63% 43% 42% 37% 29% 
SOURCE:  Office of Naval Aviation Community Manager 
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Table A.1.  Aviation Cumulative Continuation Rates (CCR) for FY 1986-2000 
 part 2 
 




ALL AVIATORS 38% 34% 54% 40% 34% 31% 40.54% 39.97% 
ALL PILOTS 40% 35% 52% 39% 32% 28% 39.33% 36.60% 
JET PILOTS 42% 38% 41% 41% 38% 29% 43.34% 36.61% 
PROP PILOTS 27% 22% 36% 23% 20% 18% 35.81% 24.72% 
HELO PILOTS 48% 43% 55% 52% 37% 34% 38.51% 48.31% 
          
          
ALL NFOS 33% 31% 59% 41% 38% 37% 43.06% 46.80% 
JET NFOS 31% 27% 64% 38% 41% 39% 48.44% 47.10% 
PROP NFOS 36% 32% 53% 44% 35% 33% 36.38% 45.74% 
          
PILOT          
VFA (F/A-18) 50% 46% 52% 60% 40% 40% 37.35% 41.15% 
VF (F-14) 54% 39% 32% 31% 45% 36% 58.02% 37.10% 
VS (S-3) 39% 26% 42% 11% 35% 19% 34.26% 26.09% 
VAW (E-2C) 40% 45% 48% 26% 20% 20% 42.81% 30.71% 
VQ JET (ES-3) 100% 13% 100% 100% 13% N/A N/A 55.14% 
VAQ (EA-6B) 46% 55% 38% 48% 60% 58% 62.73% 43.35% 
VP (P-3) 25% 24% 35% 23% 19% 16% 32.53% 24.27% 
VQ PROP (EP-3) 18% 55% 23% 48% 19% 27% 41.08% 32.53% 
VQ TAC (E-6A) 22% 9% 50% 50% 21% 13% 40.53% 22.75% 
HS (H-3, H-60) 59% 46% 55% 42% 52% 37% 47.81% 50.51% 
HM (H-53) 28% 25% 91% 49% 20% 31% 23.83% 45.22% 
HSL (H-2, H-60) 48% 45% 50% 52% 40% 34% 34.85% 47.58% 
HC (H-46, H-3, H-
53) 43% 40% 58% 54% 29% 29% 41.95% 45.58% 
          
NFO          
VF (F-14) 45% 30% 67% 34% 39% 33% 54.63% 48.10% 
VS (S-3) 26% 27% 74% 37% 46% 36% 46.90% 44.30% 
VP (P-3) 28% 27% 58% 45% 26% 27% 37.15% 43.37% 
VAQ (EA-6B) 25% 32% 65% 41% 48% 51% 47.71% 51.05% 
VAW (E-2C) 52% 40% 46% 48% 44% 41% 35.84% 49.37% 
VQ PROP (EP-3) 59% 35% 46% 32% 83% 46% 33.32% 52.27% 
VQ JET (ES-3) 12% 69% 53% 100% 38% N/A N/A 56.36% 
VQ TAC (E-6A) 44% 13% 70% 57% 50% 49% 49.51% 50.23% 
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APPENDIX B.  ARGUS DATA 
 
When queried for certain demographic groups, ARGUS will generate 2 lists by 
frequency of response.  One list is of the top 30 most important factors for the individual 
in the queried group to consider staying in the Navy, the other list is the top 30 most 
important factors influencing their decision to leave the Navy.  The Argus Data used in 
this study was obtained from the database on 16 December, 2002.  These full lists can be 
found in Appendix C.  The first column labeled “all” shows, in the order of frequency, 
the top thirty most important influences to stay in or leave the Navy.  The following five 
columns are labeled zones A, B, C, D, and E.  These zones represent the responses of the 
desired demographics with different Years of Service (YOS). 
• Zone A:  0-5 YOS 
• Zone B:  6-10 YOS 
• Zone C:  11-15 YOS 
• Zone D:  16-20 YOS 




Table B.1.  Argus Top 30 Reasons to Leave the Navy:  All Officers 
 
   Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone
  Reason to Leave All A B C D E
         
1  
Advancement/Promotion 
Opportunities  1 18 10 1 1 1
2  Availability of supplies  2 3 1 3 2 11
3  Trust Navy leadership  3 7 2 2 4 2
4  Red tape to do job  4 1 4 6 6 6
5  Current job satisfaction  5 5 8 13 7 5
6  Impact of Navy on family  6 2 3 11 11 20
7  Control over PCS assignments  7 9 6 7 13 3
8  Senior officer leadership quality  8 10 5 8 12 12
9  Recognition job accomplishments  9 16 11 5 14 4
10  Amount of pay received  10 6 7 10 18 21
11  Impact PCS moves on spouse career 11 23 9 12 8 8
12  Separation from family/friends  12 27 12 14 3 9
13  Unit morale  13 4 26 9 19 24
14  Zero defects mentality  14 21 16 4 15 19
15  Hours at sea to get job done  15 12 13 19 10 27
16  Impact of PCS moves on children  16 40 32 42 5 7
17  Balance work/personal time  17 17 15 16 9 28
18  
Immediate supervisor leadership 
quality  18 11 25 23 35 14
19  Number personnel  19 13 18 21 33 18
20  Medical Care for family  20 26 22 17 17 15
21  Childrens education  21 89 33 15 21 10
22  Respect Navy leadership  22 30 17 25 30 23
23  Department head leadership quality  23 8 30 18 82 61
24  Time training  24 15 14 . 25 49
25  Number quick response tasks  25 43 56 24 29 13
26  Changes to retiree benefits  26 54 34 37 16 22
27  Physical Fitness Standards  27 35 36 51 27 16
28  Impact of location on spouse career  28 33 23 34 20 31
29  Amount base pay  29 28 28 27 22 37
30  Recognition of job performance  30 70 40 32 26 17
Data current as of December 16, 2002: Number of Officers = 3131 
Source:  Institute for Selection and Classification 
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Table B.2.  Argus Top 30 Reasons to Stay in the Navy:  All Officers 
 
   Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone
  Reasons to Stay All A B C D E
         
1  Family support  1 13 6 1 1 3
2  Current job satisfaction  2 5 1 2 3 2
3  
Advancement/Promotion 
Opportunities  3 7 11 3 2 1
4  Job interest  4 6 5 5 4 6
5  Senior officer leadership quality  5 2 9 4 7 8
6  
Immediate supervisor leadership 
quality  6 9 2 6 6 7
7  Level Responsibility  7 20 7 9 5 4
8  Your medical benefits  8 1 19 8 12 12
9  Amount of leave you receive  9 3 8 10 15 14
10  Level job challenge  10 15 13 7 11 9
11  Camaraderie 11 8 4 12 10 13
12  
Opp to work in primary 
rate/designator  12 14 3 19 8 10
13  Amount of pay received  13 22 15 16 14 5
14  Educational benefits  14 11 10 14 18 17
15  Working relations in Navy  15 27 16 13 19 11
16  Control over PCS assignments  16 24 12 17 13 15
17  Unit morale  17 17 26 21 9 16
18  Medical Care for family  18 21 14 22 17 21
19  Opp to travel  19 12 18 29 16 26
20  Value of your benefits  20 16 21 28 22 19
21  PCS to jobs in good location  21 19 22 11 23 24
22  
Professional Development 
Opportunities  22 28 31 15 27 18
23  Your dental benefits  23 4 67 23 38 51
24  Respect Navy leadership  24 18 . 41 20 20
25  Department head leadership quality  25 10 17 33 33 45
26  Availability commissary  26 25 50 27 21 23
27  Availability of detailer  27 34 25 24 25 22
28  Job complexity  28 44 29 20 31 34
29  Career Enhancing Opportunities  29 33 53 18 34 28
30  Cost family medical care  30 30 23 26 32 50
Data current as of December 16, 2002: Number of Officers = 3131 
Source:  Institute for Selection and Classification 
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Table B.3.  Argus Top 30 Reasons to Leave the Navy:  Unrestricted Line Officers 
 
   Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone
  Reason to Leave All A B C D E
         
1  Availability of supplies  1 1 1 2 2 19
2  
Advancement/Promotion 
Opportunities  2 26 20 1 1 1
3  Trust Navy leadership  3 16 2 3 6 6
4  Impact of Navy on family  4 2 3 6 4 14
5  Red tape to do job  5 3 5 15 7 2
6  Control over PCS assignments  6 6 4 4 15 4
7  Current job satisfaction  7 11 6 14 11 8
8  Senior officer leadership quality  8 5 7 11 12 21
9  Separation from family/friends  9 42 11 10 5 3
10  Hours at sea to get job done  10 8 9 8 3 25
11  Impact PCS moves on spouse career 11 22 10 7 8 13
12  Balance work/personal time  12 10 14 12 10 18
13  Recognition job accomplishments  13 14 15 13 19 7
14  Zero defects mentality  14 17 17 5 22 26
15  Medical Care for family  15 21 18 25 17 12
16  Time training  16 9 8 . 16 39
17  Impact of PCS moves on children  17 75 43 . 9 5
18  Number personnel  18 19 22 24 33 22
19  Amount of pay received  19 30 23 21 36 15
20  Respect Navy leadership  20 33 13 34 27 20
21  Number quick response tasks  21 35 38 16 30 10
22  Childrens education  22 . 31 18 24 9
23  
Immediate supervisor leadership 
quality  23 12 75 35 62 16
24  Unit morale  24 4 37 20 67 51
25  Recognition of job performance  25 47 39 23 21 11
26  Repair parts needed  26 39 16 9 41 55
27  Department head leadership quality  27 7 27 54 63 87
28  Job interest  28 18 29 41 32 33
29  Hours in port to get job done  29 13 28 22 38 68
30  Impact of location on spouse career  30 41 26 30 23 27
Data current as of December 16, 2002: Number of URL Officers = 1613 
Source:  Institute for Selection and Classification 
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Table B.4.  Argus Top 30 Reasons to Stay in the Navy:  Unrestricted Line Officers 
 
   Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone
  Reason to Stay All A B C D E
         
1  Current job satisfaction  1 6 1 2 2 1
2  Family support  2 17 5 1 1 3
3  
Advancement/Promotion 
Opportunities  3 10 11 6 4 2
4  Job interest  4 3 6 4 7 5
5  Senior officer leadership quality  5 1 2 3 13 10
6  Level Responsibility  6 35 8 11 3 4
7  
Immediate supervisor leadership 
quality  7 12 7 5 5 9
8  Camaraderie 8 5 4 13 10 6
9  Level job challenge  9 13 12 7 8 7
10  
Opp to work in primary 
rate/designator  10 8 3 19 9 15
11  Amount of leave you receive  11 7 10 9 11 19
12  Your medical benefits  12 2 19 8 18 18
13  Amount of pay received  13 18 9 12 16 8
14  Unit morale  14 16 33 15 6 13
15  Working relations in Navy  15 44 29 17 17 11
16  Control over PCS assignments  16 20 17 14 14 14
17  Educational benefits  17 11 15 24 19 20
18  Opp to travel  18 9 22 29 12 30
19  PCS to jobs in good location  19 22 18 10 24 28
20  Medical Care for family  20 23 14 32 15 25
21  Availability of detailer  21 29 16 26 31 12
22  Your dental benefits  22 4 62 34 37 .
23  Availability commissary  23 41 43 21 20 22
24  Respect Navy leadership  24 14 . 38 28 21
25  Department head leadership quality  25 15 13 22 75 .
26  
Professional Development 
Opportunities  26 . . 23 21 16
27  Co-worker competence  27 32 21 28 33 24
28  Job complexity  28 36 23 16 60 31
29  Cost family medical care  29 24 25 20 27 .
30  PCS to leadership jobs  30 31 . 18 25 29
Data current as of December 16, 2002: Number of URL Officers = 1613 
Source:  Institute for Selection and Classification 
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Table B.5.  Argus Top 30 Reasons to Leave the Navy:  Aviators 
 
   Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone
  Reason to Leave All A B C D E
         
1  Availability of supplies  1 1 1 1 1 9
2  Trust Navy leadership  2 14 2 9 10 7
3  
Advancement/Promotion 
Opportunities  3 . 16 2 2 1
4  Control over PCS assignments  4 2 8 3 15 2
5  PCS moves on spouse career  5 10 4 14 3 11
6  Red tape to do job  6 . 3 31 4 3
7  Medical Care for family  7 4 42 13 5 4
8  Impact of Navy on family  8 5 22 7 6 44
9  Repair parts needed  9 . 5 4 12 33
10  Separation from family/friends  10 31 45 8 7 12
11  Senior officer leadership quality  11 37 7 10 29 50
12  
Opp to work in primary 
rate/designator  12 7 26 6 11 8
13  Impact of location on spouse career  13 11 9 15 46 20
14  Hours at sea to get job done  14 22 19 11 18 15
15  Current job satisfaction  15 . 13 . 13 10
16  Number personnel  16 27 6 . 42 19
17  Cost of housing  17 . 14 32 8 39
18  Impact of PCS moves on children  18 . . . 14 5
19  Childrens education  19 . . 36 24 6
20  Amount BAH  20 . 48 17 9 45
21  Respect Navy leadership  21 . 10 43 53 23
22  Balance work/personal time  22 8 29 . 19 16
23  Ability to get medical appointments  23 . 43 5 23 .
24  Unit morale  24 3 27 21 . .
25  Number quick response tasks  25 . 18 23 17 29
26  Recognition job accomplishments  26 25 20 25 37 31
27  Time training  27 23 12 . 36 .
28  Recognition of job performance  28 . 33 . 20 17
29  Zero defects mentality  29 26 36 12 . 35
30  Ability to take leave  30 6 49 . . 48
Data current as of December 16, 2002: Number of Aviators = 490 
Source:  Institute for Selection and Classification 
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Table B.6.  Argus Top 30 Reasons to Stay in the Navy:  Aviators 
 
    Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone
  Reason to Stay All A B C D E
         
1  Current job satisfaction  1 15 2 3 1 1
2  Job interest  2 1 3 4 4 2
3  Family support  3 19 8 1 5 3
4  
Opp to work in primary 
rate/designator  4 2 4 19 3 5
5  Camaraderie 5 12 1 2 7 10
6  Senior officer leadership quality  6 6 5 6 11 12
7  
Advancement/Promotion 
Opportunities  7 11 21 7 2 4
8  Level Responsibility  8 . 6 11 8 7
9  
Immediate supervisor leadership 
quality  9 31 45 5 9 9
10  Unit morale  10 . 30 8 6 6
11  Level job challenge  11 16 7 12 25 15
12  Your medical benefits  12 3 . 31 17 16
13  Amount of pay received  13 . 16 29 . 11
14  Working relations in Navy  14 29 19 . . 8
15  PCS to jobs in good location  15 . 10 17 15 .
16  Co-worker competence  16 13 31 21 23 14
17  Amount of leave you receive  17 24 . 33 10 26
18  Respect Navy leadership  18 5 . . 37 17
19  Control over PCS assignments  19 . 26 . 14 13
20  Opp to travel  20 . 12 9 24 .
21  Educational benefits  21 27 17 . 32 .
22  
Professional Development 
Opportunities  22 . . 14 13 18
23  Quality of training  23 . 23 15 19 19
24  Availability of detailer  24 . 9 16 . .
25  Job difficulty  25 . 11 27 . .
26  Coworker competence  26 . 35 . 16 24
27  Cost family medical care  27 20 38 28 28 .
28  Your dental benefits  28 4 . . . .
29  Availability commissary  29 28 . 35 33 28
30  Department head leadership quality  30 9 20 . . .
Data current as of December 16, 2002: Number of Aviators = 490 
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